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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE COLLAPSE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT
Ian A. Mallory*
In October 1985 the International Tin Council (I.T.C. or Council),
the operating arm of the International Tin Agreement (I.T.A. or
Agreement), became insolvent and had to suspend its stabilizing activi-
ties in the market. The I.T.C. had incurred liabilities of nine hundred
million pounds sterling ($1.4 billion) to a host of banks and metal bro-
kers. This insolvency precipitated a crisis in the London metal and fi-
nancial markets of unprecedented proportions. Banks which had ex-
tended generous loans to the Council were faced with enormous losses.
Metal brokers on the London Metal Exchange (L.M.E. or Exchange)
which had processed the Council's trades braced themselves for a chain
reaction of bankruptcies that would threaten the Exchange's very exis-
tence. Tin producing firms around the world watched with horror the
tin price plummet and responded by closing mine after mine, throwing
tens of thousands of miners out of work. All parties expressed shock
that the I.T.C., widely considered a model international institution and
an impeccable credit risk, could get into trouble so quickly and com-
pletely. They immediately turned to the Agreement's members for
leadership if not for redress.
The twenty-two states which were members of the Agreement, how-
ever, conspicuously failed to come to the rescue of the Council. Al-
though they had launched the Council thirty years earlier to administer
* A.B. (Harvard), LL.B. (Toronto), M. Phil. (Cambridge); of the Bar of Ontario.
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an ambitious international scheme to regulate the world's tin market
and had since regularly taken part in its activities, the member states
disclaimed any responsibility for the debts of the Council or for the
wider effects of its demise. They also refused to implement timely and
comprehensive rescue plans to ameliorate the hardship.
Parties to the crisis predicted that the consequences of the govern-
ments' conduct would extend well beyond the immediate crisis and
would be dire. They alleged that not only were the member states de-
stroying much of the world's tin market and causing mayhem in the
City of London, but also were establishing a dangerous precedent for
the operations of other international organizations and for sovereign
lending. The creditors resorted to direct legal action against the mem-
ber states, but had little success: the courts upheld the members' claim
that they were not liable for the Council's debts.
In June 1989 the I.T.A. formally expired and the member states did
not renew it. In December 1989 the legal actions against the states
were settled out-of-court for a fraction of the amounts claimed. The
demise of the Agreement can now be seen with broader perspective.
This article will examine the events leading to the collapse, the causes
for it and its effects. It will demonstrate: that the seeds of the Agree-
ment's demise were sown in the late 1960s and sprouted by 1981; that
some members had misgivings about the course which the Agreement
was following, but shut their eyes to the probable consequences; that
the regulators knew of the I.T.C.'s financial problems at least eighteen
months before the insolvency, but they took no effective measures to
prevent it from happening; that fortuitous changes in exchange rates
finally pushed the Council over the brink; and that many creditors of
the Council are partially responsible for the damage they suffered as
they not only improperly assessed the credit risk of the Council, but
also failed to reduce their exposure when officially informed of the risk
months before the collapse.
This article will show that the effects of the collapse of the I.T.A. are
many, but not necessarily those which had been predicted. The tin
market suffered only a temporary, if severe, set-back. The L.M.E. also
was badly hit, but has recovered most of its prominence in international
tin trading. The tin collapse did not sound the death knell for other
commodity agreements, except perhaps for those which were already
infirm. The creditor's court actions have established legal precedents
with important implications for international law and organization, but
few, if any, for sovereign lending.
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I. THE TIN MARKET
Tin is a much sought-after member of the family of non-ferrous met-
als, but is only used in relatively small quantities in alloys. Finished
products with tin content currently range from the humble can for the
packaging industry to sophisticated electronics.1 As with any industrial
raw material, most tin is consumed in developed countries. Indeed, the
European Community (E.C.), the United States, and Japan together
account for about two-thirds of the world's annual consumption.2
This geographical concentration of consumption mirrors a concentra-
tion in the loci of production. Tin is present in abundance in two geo-
graphical areas. The main region is in south-eastern Asia, in Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and China. The second main region is in central
South America, in Bolivia, and Brazil. Other deposits are found in the
Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Nigeria, and
Zaire.3 Deposits of tin are present in both lode and alluvial formations
and are recovered by a variety of techniques.4
It is difficult to make general comments about the relative success of
tin mining in these countries or by these techniques. The profitability of
each individual mine depends on the cost per unit of the ore it pro-
duces. The crucial variables determining costs are the quality and ac-
cessibility of deposits.5 The interplay of these two factors produces a
matrix of greatly differing production costs between individual mines.
Although most countries have both low and high cost mines, certain
important national distinctions exist. The costs of Bolivia's mines are
currently almost all high, the United Kingdom's above average, and
those in Brazil the lowest in the world. 6
1. See W.L. BALDWIN, THE WORLD TIN MARKET: POLITICAL PRICING AND Eco-
NOMIC COMPETITION (1983), and INTERNATIONAL TIN COUNCIL, TIN STATISTICS 1976-
1987, at 7 (London 1987) [hereinafter I.T.C. STATISTICS] (describing some of tin's
varied applications).
2. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 31; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), INTERNATIONAL TIN STATISTICS, BULLETIN
No. 1 (London 1989) [hereinafter TIN STATISTICS].
3. For a discussion of the locations and practices of tin production in the Soviet
Union, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Nigeria, and Zaire, see W.L. BALDWIN,
supra note 1, at 22-45; W. Fox, TIN: THE WORKING OF A COMMODITY AGREEMENT
21-85 (London 1974); and W. ROBERTSON, TIN: ITS PRODUCTION AND MARKETING
57-70 (London 1982); see also INTERNATIONAL TIN COUNCIL, TIN PRODUCTION AND
INVESTMENT (1979) [hereinafter TIN PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT] (describing ex-
ploration, prospecting, and production of tin in the Soviet Union, United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, Nigeria, and Zaire).
4. TIN PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT, supra note 3, at 33-67. These techniques
include open-cast and shaft mine, floating dredge and gravel pump. Id.
5. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 2.
6. See TIN PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT, supra note 3, at 127 (discussing the
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The prevailing price of tin primarily determines which of the various
mines around the world will be operating profitably at any given time.
For decades, the world price of tin has been set in two main places, the
Malaysian market and the L.M.E.7 These two markets traditionally
have operated very differently. The Malaysian market (held at Penang
until September 1984 and at the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange
thereafter) was until 1987 a physical market for locally produced tin
with prices set in Malaysian ringgits. Delivery to purchasers was
prompt and acceptance of the metal expected; speculation therefore
was little evident. 8
By contrast, L.M.E. is an open futures market which the traders
themselves administer. The L.M.E. has had two main functions: first,
to provide standards for brands and contracts for a variety of metals;
and second, to provide a forum for trading, the "Ring" around which
members gather and the rules they follow when there. Prices for tin
were (until 1989) quoted in pounds sterling for immediate delivery or
at a specified time in the future, usually three months. Traders on the
L.M.E. (until 1987) dealt with each other as principals without the
Exchange interposing itself between them. 9 The L.M.E. has attracted
the vast majority of the world's paper transactions involving tin, be
they for purposes of hedging or speculation. 0
Movements in the tin prices on the Malaysian market and the
L.M.E. have usually corresponded, but not identically because traders
who operate between the markets must contend with substantial freight
and insurance charges as well as currency fluctuations. The latter fac-
tor is particularly important because the Malaysian ringgit is linked to
the United States dollar. 1 Nonetheless, the tin price on both markets
fluctuates violently. Compared to that of other metals markets, the vol-
ume of trading in tin is low. 12 More importantly, like the prices of all
detailed survey of costs according to country and method of mining); Wagstyl, Paying
the Price of the Market's Collapse, Fin. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at 16.
7. Memorandum submitted by the 13 Ring Dealing Members of the London
Metal Exchange with Forward Sales to the International Tin Council (Feb. 12, 1986)
[hereinafter Memorandum of the Ring Dealers], reprinted in 2 HousE OF COMMONS,
TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, THE TIN CRIsIs, SECOND REPORT 1985-86, at 78,
84-85 (1986) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT II].
8. W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 127; W. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 128.
9. See R. GIBSON-JARVIE, THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE: A COMMODITY
MARKET 33 (Cambridge 1983) (stating that L.M.E. traders traditionally dealt with
each other as principals).
10. See W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 142, and W. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at
129 (estimating that physical dealings traditionally have constituted fewer than 15 per
cent of transactions in tin contracts on the L.M.E.).
11. W. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 127.
12. R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 74.
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commodities, the price of tin reacts strongly to influences which are
both cyclical and long-term.
Temporary variation in consumers' demand is the primary cause of
the cyclical movement.13 Trend movements involve the interplay of
long-term supply and demand and occur more slowly and impercepti-
bly. Tin supply is dependant primarily on production costs. The effect
of cost changes on the market is difficult to predict and can be enor-
mous. For example, over the past ten years Brazil has used its substan-
tial cost advantage as a springboard to leap in front of Malaysia and
Indonesia as the world's largest producer.1 4 Demand for tin has not
increased with overall economic growth because consumers have been
using tin more efficiently in their products and switching to competitive
substitutes; 15 the volume of tin metal consumed annually has barely
risen over the past decade.16
Beset by chronic medium term cyclical pressures and uncertain
trends for supply and demand in the long term, the tin market is inher-
ently erratic. This uncertainty hampers economic planning for nations
as well as for individual firms. As a natural response, numerous politi-
cal efforts have been made to tame the market or insulate certain coun-
tries from its effects. The strongest two such political efforts have been
the accumulation and adjustment of the United States strategic stock-
pile and the implementation of the lengthy series of international regu-
latory agreements which culminated in the Sixth I.T.A. of 1982-89.
The United States strategic stockpile of tin originated on the eve of
World War II and expanded enormously during the Korean War. By
1955, the United States General Services Administration (G.S.A.) pos-
sessed a stockpile of 350,000 tonnes, equivalent to world consumption
for two years, far larger than any rational strategic requirement of the
country justified.17 Since 1962, the G.S.A. has gradually reduced its
target level for the tin stockpile and has declared the remainder of its
holdings as surplus to be sold. Under pressure from producing countries
13. Id. at 72-73; see W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 127; TIN PRODUCTION AND
INVESTMENT, supra note 3, at 108 (stating that medium and long-term movements of
actual prices are influenced by world economic conditions, inflation, exchange rate fluc-
tuations, levels of industrial activity and technological changes, as well as supply
features).
14. See I.T.C. STATisTiCs, supra note 1, at 19 (indicating that Brazil produced
6,645 tonnes of tin-in-concentrates in 1979); TIN STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 6 (show-
ing that Brazil produced 44,000 tonnes of tin-in-concentrates in 1988).
15. I.T.C. STATISTIcS, supra note 1, at 77-102.
16. See id. at 30 (stating that world consumption of tin metal was 185,700 tonnes
in 1979); TIN STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 16 (indicating that world consumption of tin
metal increased to 189,000 tonnes in 1988).
17. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 226-42.
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not to disrupt the market, the United States did not liquidate its stocks
but has reduced them gradually, selling tin in small amounts and gen-
erally in times of higher prices. 8
II. THE AGREEMENT
International agreements have regulated tin trade for most of the
past seventy years. Two separate series of agreements, divided by
World War II, have occurred. This study is concerned with the latter
series, which comprised six agreements from 1956 to 1989.11
A. OBJECTS AND STRUCTURE
The war so disrupted the world's tin market that an international tin
study group was established to consider international regulation of the
market. The group first met in 1947 and took its direction from the
concurrently formulated Havana Charter, the constitution of the pro-
posed International Trade Organization. Although the Charter was
never implemented, it sanctioned the establishment of international
agreements to reduce burdensome surpluses of and fluctuations in price
of commodities for the benefit of both producer and consumer."
The negotiations of the group, convened under the auspices of the
United Nations, took years to conclude. The United States partially
caused the delay by putting its partisan interests first and declining to
be involved in any arrangement which might constrain its freedom to
manage its strategic stockpile.2' The other group members eventually
proceeded without the United States and in 1954 concluded the I.T.A.,
to be in force from 1956.22
The fifteen founding members of the I.T.A., six producers and nine
consumers, 23 embraced a very wide variety of interests. Producing and
18. W. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 147.
19. The first international agreement governing tin was the Bandoeng pool, initi-
ated in 1921 as an ad hoc measure to withhold stocks of tin from the South-East Asian
market during two years of falling prices. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 112-98. A series of
four international tin control agreements were in force from 1931 to regulate a produc-
ers' cartel. Id.
20. Id. at 205-07.
21. See McFadden, The Collapse of Tin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity
Agreement, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 817 (1986) (stating that a crucial factor in the
decision of the United States not to join the First I.T.A. was its unwillingness to accept
a constraint on managing its own stockpile).
22. International Tin Agreement, Mar. 1, 1954, 1956 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 50 (Cmd.
12) [hereinafter First I.T.A.]
23. The producer countries were Belgian Congo, Bolivia, Malaya, Nigeria, Indone-
sia and Thailand. Id. at 75. The consumers were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Ecuador, France, India, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the United King-
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consuming countries had obvious dissimilar interests, but the interests
of the consuming countries were also not congruent. Although all
hoped to benefit from greater price stability, many had colonial or com-
mercial ties to producing countries.24 The diverse interests of the mem-
ber states all found their way into the specific objectives of the I.T.A.,
the three most important of which were:
(a) to prevent or alleviate widespread unemployment or under-employment
and other serious difficulties which are likely to result from maladjustments be-
tween the supply of and the demand for tin;
(b) to prevent excessive fluctuations in the price of tin and to achieve a reason-
able degree of stability of price on a basis which will secure long-term equilib-
rium between supply and demand;
(c) to ensure adequate supplies of tin at reasonable prices at all times. '
These objectives were obviously ambitious and difficult to reconcile, but
the I.T.A. gave little guidance for their attainment; in particular, it
failed to proffer a definition of "reasonable prices." The operating arm
of the I.T.A., the I.T.C., was left to attain these objectives on a day-to-
day basis.
Under the Agreement, the I.T.C. was to specify, as often as eco-
nomic circumstances required, a relatively narrow range of prices
within which it believed the market for tin would be in relative equilib-
rium. 6 If the market did not maintain its price within this band, the
I.T.C. was to intervene and attempt to compel it to do so. The I.T.C.
possessed two weapons to compel such compliance, export controls and
a buffer stock. The I.T.A. considered export quotas on members to be
the more important mechanism. The I.T.C.'s restriction of the exports
of its producing members would adjust the tin supply on the interna-
tional market to the prevailing demand. The buffer stock would assist
by rectifying any discrepancies which remained between supply and de-
mand by judicious buying and selling of tin on the open market.2 7
dom. Id.
24. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 254-57.
25. First I.T.A., supra note 22, art. I, at 2.
26. See id. art. VI, at 8 (setting the floor and ceiling prices of tin at £640 and £880
per tonne respectively). The Council was from time to time to consider whether the
floor and ceiling prices are appropriate for the attainment of the Agreement objectives.
Id.
27. Id. art. VII. The buffer stock was to purchase tin when the market price was
equal to or below the floor price, and to sell tin when it was at or above the ceiling
price. Id. art. IX. When the price was in the middle third of the band, the buffer stock
was to be inactive unless the Council specially authorized otherwise. Id. When the
price was in the upper or lower thirds, the buffer stock had discretionary powers to sell
or buy respectively, if so doing would stabilize the price. Id. The producing countries'
contributions of both cash and tin to a total equivalent of 25,000 tonnes financed the
buffer stock. Id. Once these resources were exhausted, the buffer stock was to suspend
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Consuming countries endorsed the use of these tools for two reasons.
First, export controls were only supposed to be temporary measures.
Second, the effect of the buffer stock was to be relatively neutral over
time, as gains to producers in times of low prices would offset the gains
to consumers in times of high prices.2 8
The I.T.C. made major decisions through a complex process. In
keeping with the Agreement's spirit of equal partnership between pro-
ducer and consumer, members were classified as either producers or
consumers and each bloc had one thousand votes; each country's promi-
nence in the market determined the distribution of votes within each
bloc.29 The importance of a decision determined the ratification process
required, ranging from a simple majority to a "distributed two-thirds
majority" of votes in each bloc."
The I.T.C. was to have a full-time staff, headed by a senior officer
who the members would elect. A separate officer managed the buffer
stock.31 The I.T.A. established various committees, the most important
of which compiled and disseminated detailed statistics on the world's
tin industry. 2
The I.T.C. could trade under its own name because the I.T.A. gave
the Council "in each participating country, to the extent consistent
with its law, such legal capacity as may be necessary for the discharge
of its functions." 3  The I.T.C. was granted exemption from taxation on
its assets, income, and other property.34 The I.T.A. placed the Council
seat in London,35 close to the L.M.E., the most important metal market
on which the buffer stock was to trade.36 Because the L.M.E. quoted its
tin contract in pounds sterling, the target price band of the I.T.A. also
its operations. Id. The buffer stock was expressly empowered to trade on the forward
markets, subject to the general restriction of operating only when it had either cash or
tin in hand. Id.
28. See W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 119-21 (discussing the neutralizing effect
of the buffer stock). For excellent analysis of the economics of commodity price stabili-
zation and the buffer stock, see MacBean & Nguyen, International Commodity Agree-
ments: Shadow and Substance, 15 WORLD DEV. 575, 576 (1987), and D. NEWBERY &
J. STIGLITZ, THE THEORY OF COMMODITY PRICE STABILIZATION: A STUDY IN THE
ECONOMICS OF RISK 16 (Oxford 1981).
29. First I.T.A., supra note 22, art. IV, at C.
30. Id. arts. II & IV, at C.
31. Id. art. IV, at A.
32. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 261.
33. First I.T.A., supra note 22, art. IV, at E.
34. Id., amended by Amendment to Article IV of the International Tin Agreement,
Oct. 18, 1956, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 42 (Cmd. 556).
35. First I.T.A., supra note 22, art. IV, at A.
36. Id. art. IX.
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was expressed in sterling.37
The parties entered into a Second Agreement for a further quinquen-
nium from 1961 to 1966 with virtually identical objectives and struc-
ture.38 The only significant changes were a reduction in the buffer stock
to 20,000 tonnes,39 stipulations that most important decisions required
a "distributed two-thirds majority," 40 and the accession of new con-
suming members, including Japan.41 No other producing countries
joined the Second Agreement.
The transition from the Second to the Third Agreement could have
been as automatic as that from the First to the Second, but the diplo-
matic world of 1965 was much different from that of 1960. Developing
countries, many of which had just gained independence, suddenly be-
came important actors on the world stage and demanded that interna-
tional economic arrangements directly serve their needs. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which
had been convened in 1964, recommended that international commod-
ity agreements actively facilitate development; not only were commod-
ity agreements to stabilize prices and production, but were to increase
the export earnings of developing producing countries.42
Four other international commodity agreements were then in exis-
tence.43 With tin being a classic example of an industrial commodity
produced in developing countries and consumed in developed ones, and
long the subject of international regulation, the I.T.A. received early
attention from UNCTAD. The conference which negotiated the third
I.T.A. was convened under the auspices of UNCTAD, and dutifully
included its goals in the restated list of the Agreement's objectives. The
I.T.A. would now also be dedicated:
(c) To make arrangements which will help maintain and increase the export
earnings from tin especially those of the developing producing countries, thereby
helping to provide such countries with resources for accelerated economic growth
and social development, while at the same time taking into account the interests
of consumers in importing countries;
(d) To ensure conditions which will help achieve a dynamic and rising rate of
production of tin on the basis of a remunerative return to producers which will
37. Id. art. VI.
38. Second International Tin Agreement, Sept. 1, 1960, 1962 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 45
(Cmd. 1759) [hereinafter Second I.T.A.].
39. Id. art. VIII.
40. Id. arts. VI & VII.
41. Id. at Annex B.
42. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 240-47.
43. See F. GORDON-ASHWORTH, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CONTROL: A CON-
TEMPORARY HISTORY AND APPRAISAL 72, 73 (London 1984) (discussing the other com-
modity agreements for sugar, coffee, wheat, and olive oil).
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help secure an adequate supply at prices fair to consumers and which will help
provide a long-term equilibrium between production and consumption. 4
The addition of an express developmental goal to the Agreement
greatly exacerbated the latent tension in its objectives. As William Fox
put it in the early 1970s, "every question [was] so begged and every
viewpoint admirably squared." '45
Another fateful change to the structure of the I.T.A. was made in
1965: the I.T.C. received the power to borrow for the purposes of the
buffer stock upon the security of the tin it held. Interestingly, the third
I.T.A. stipulated that no participating country was to incur any obliga-
tions for such debts of the Council without that country's consent. 4"
Again, no new producing members acceded to the pact.
The Fourth Agreement, entered into in 1970, made further impor-
tant changes in the accord's structure. As its membership widened,
West Germany joined as a consuming member.41 The E.C. also became
a signatory.4" No new producing countries joined the Agreement, al-
though Australia changed its category from consumer to producer. 4"
The juridical character of the I.T.C. was clarified to emphasize its
status as a separate international organization, entitled to the usual
diplomatic immunities. The I.T.A. now stipulated that "the Council
shall have legal personality. It shall in particular have the capacity to
contract, acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property and
to institute legal proceedings." 50 The fourth I.T.A. further stated that
the Council would enter into an agreement with the government of the
United Kingdom relating to the status, privileges and immunities of the
Council and its staff.51 The parties duly executed a Headquarters
Agreement, re-affirming the Council's "legal personality"52 and grant-
ing the Council immunity from jurisdiction and execution, except in
cases when the Council had waived immunity or been subject to an
44. Third International Tin Agreement, June 1-Dec. 31, 1965, 1967 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 50 (Cmd. 3353), art. I [hereinafter Third I.T.A].
45. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 247.
46. Third I.T.A., supra note 44, art. X.
47. Fourth International Tin Agreement, July 1, 1970-Jan. 29, 1971, 1971 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 91 (Cmd. 4831) [hereinafter Fourth I.T.A.].
48. W. Fox, supra note 3, at 251. Although members states of the E.C. had to
continue to vote formally on a national basis, they could now do so as a bloc. Id.
49. Fourth I.T.A., supra note 47, at Annex A.
50. Id. art XIV.
51. Id. art. V.
52. Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Tin Council, Feb. 9, 1972,
1972 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 38 (Cmd. 4938), art. 3.
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arbitration award.53 When the Council entered into a written contract
with a person or corporation resident in the United Kingdom, the con-
tract had to allow either party the right to seek private arbitration of
any dispute which arose regarding the contract. " The British govern-
ment concurrently issued an executive order-in-council, granting the
I.T.C. "the capacities of a body corporate""5 and affirming in the
United Kingdom the above limited immunity. 6 This constituted the ex-
tent of British legislation implementing the I.T.A.; Parliament did not
formally incorporate the Agreement as a whole into domestic law.
In 1972, changes in the foreign exchange value of the pound sterling,
consequent upon its float, induced the Council to set its price band in
Malaysian ringgits.57 As the Council's financial arrangements were
made and tin trading on the L.M.E. was denominated in pounds ster-
ling, this change caused the Council to straddle two currency markets
and therefore assume greater foreign exchange risk in its operations.
The Fifth I.T.A., entered into in 1975 for the period 1976 to 1981,58
made three important changes. First, a new paragraph in the preamble
endorsed the New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.), the
United Nations program to reform the world's economy by redistrib-
uting wealth from rich to poor countries.59 Second, the countries estab-
lished a target for "voluntary" contributions to the buffer stock from
consumer countries at 20,000 tonnes of tin metal or its equivalent in
cash, which effectively would double the size of the buffer stock. 60 The
third, and by far the most important change, however, was the acces-
sion of the United States which suppressed its long-standing antipathy
to participation.61
The accession of the United States markedly increased the propor-
53. Id. art. 8.
54. Id. art. 23.
55. Diplomatic and International Immunities and Privileges, The International Tin
Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order, SI 1972 No. 120, § 5 (United Kingdom
1972).
56. Id. § 6.
57. Memorandum submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry (Feb. 19,
1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 146, 154 [hereinafter Memo-
randum of the D.T.I.].
58. Fifth International Tin Agreement, July 1, 1975-Apr. 30, 1976, 1977 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 110 (Cmd. 7033) [hereinafter Fifth I.T.A.].
59. Id. preamble, para. b.
60. Id. art. 22; see Memorandum submitted by the London Metal Exchange (Jan.
29, 1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 42, 50 [hereinafter Memo-
randum from the L.M.E.] (stating that eight countries were eventually to make
contributions).
61. W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 92-94; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 483-84 (1977).
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tion of the world's consumption covered by the Agreement, but has-
tened the escalation of friction between its members over its purpose
and conduct. Tension had existed since at least the commencement of
the Third Agreement, but had been kept under control as members
routinely compromised on crucial issues. Producing countries, espe-
cially those with the higher cost mines, such as Bolivia, now wanted the
I.T.A. to emphasize its objective to raise their earnings from tin. The
price band would be kept high and if export control were necessary,
high cost countries would be guaranteed generous quotas.62 Whatever
their sympathies for the aspirations of many developing countries,
many officials in the developed world responded to this focus on raising
commodity prices by rejecting the scheme outright as unrealistic and
inefficient.6 3 A struggle ensued over which vision of international econ-
omy the I.T.A. would follow: that of the Havana Charter or of
UNCTAD/N.I.E.O. 4
As the Fifth Agreement was ending, acrimony began to taint the
deliberations of the Council, virtually paralyzing its operations.60 Many
of the members abandoned the machinery of the Council and indepen-
dently intervened in the tin market to forward their own perceived best
interests. The United States embarked on large sales from its strategic
stockpile. 6 In response, Malaysia launched a secret crash purchasing
program to drive up the price, with some initial success.67
This thinly veiled conflict did not augur well for the conclusion of a
Sixth Agreement. The negotiations dragged on so long that the parties
extended the Fifth Agreement to 1982.8 A Sixth Accord was ulti-
mately concluded, but it was as much a testimony to failure as to suc-
62. As one commentator from a developing country blithely put it, developed coun-
tries were now to derive little, if any, direct net benefit from the I.T.A.; "[t]he question
of who has actually gained from price stabilization [of tin] needs to be looked at care-
fully if the benefits of price stabilization are not to flow to the rich countries." Desai,
Stabilization of Primary Product Prices: the Lessons of the International Tin Agree-
ment, in COMMODITIES FINANCE AND TRADE: ISSUES IN NORTH SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS
172 (A. Senguputa ed. London 1980).
63. A good expression of the position of many developed countries can be found in
Evans, International Commodity Policy: UNCTAD and NIEO in Search of a Ration-
ale, 7 WORLD DEV. 259 (1979); see also D. NEWBERY & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 28,
at 439.
64. W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 94-99.
65. Id.
66. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 46.
67. See W.L. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 5 (revealing that this episode of the "mys-
tery buyer" caused great disruption and consternation in the market at the time);
Sulong, Malaysian Leader Comes Clean on Tin Buying Operation, Fin. Times, Sept.
19, 1986, at 40 (stating that in 1986 the Malaysian government admitted that it had
been responsible and had lost millions of dollars in the process).
68. Memorandum from the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 50.
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cess. Bolivia and the United States decided that the Agreement did not
meet their respective interests, so both decided to pull out of it."9
Malaysia was also minded to withdraw from the pact in favor of a
producers' cartel but was prevailed upon not to do so.7 0 The United
Kingdom also had grave concerns about remaining in an International
Tin Agreement which did not bind very important producers such as
Bolivia and Brazil, and consumers such as the United States. The
United Kingdom chose to remain a member in the hope of maintaining
consumer influence over tin producers generally and attaining particu-
lar diplomatic advantage with Malaysia."
The I.T.A., now handicapped by a serious loss in membership, could
only enter into force provisionally. Nonetheless, its twenty-two mem-
bers 2 purported to enormously expand the size of the buffer stock to
50,000 tonnes of tin metal; contributions from the government would
finance 30,000 tonnes of a "normal stock" and borrowing would finance
20,000 tonnes of "additional stock."73 The producer and consumer
countries would underwrite equally the normal stock .74 To obtain loans
for the additional stock, the Council was to "use as security [tin] stock
warrants and, if necessary, government guarantees/government under-
takings"7 to the I.T.C.. The Council also was empowered to borrow
such sums as it deemed necessary for the buffer stock, upon the secur-
ity of tin warrants held by the buffer stock.7
In a fatal defect in drafting, the Sixth Agreement only stipulated
how the assets and administrative deficit of the I.T.C. would be appor-
tioned among its members upon the Agreement's termination. Any re-
maining assets were to be distributed among members in proportion to
69. Wassermann, UNCTAD: Sixth International Tin Agreement, J. WORLD
TRADE L. 557, 558 (1981).
70. McFadden, supra note 21, at 820.
71. Friction had developed between the governments of Malaysia and the United
Kingdom over the former's restrictive procurement and investment policies. See Testi-
mony of Mrs. L. Chalker, M.P. and the Rt. Hon. P. Channon, M.P. (Dec. 3, 1986)
reprinted in HousE OF COMMONS, TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, THE TIN CRISIS:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, FIRST REPORT 1986-87, at 3 (1986) [hereinafter FIRsT RE-
PORT] (stating that Malaysia had a policy of "buy British last").
72. Memorandum of the D.T.I., supra note 57, at 146. The producing members
were: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand and Zaire. Id. The consuming
members were: Belgium/Luxemburg, Canada, Denmark, the E.C., France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Id.
73. Sixth International Tin Agreement, Apr. 30, 1982, Misc. 13, (Cmd. 8546), art.
21 [hereinafter Sixth I.T.A.].
74. Id. art. 22.
75. Id. art. 21.
76. Id. art. 24.
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their contributions, and any Council obligations to the staff were to be
met by supplementary contributions from members.7 7 The drafters did
not give any apparent consideration to how to deal with any debts to
third parties from the operations of the buffer stock. In particular, un-
like the previous three Agreements, the fourth included no express lan-
guage discussing the liability of members for such debts.
Members' contributions were not sufficient to fill the envisaged buffer
stock. The defections from membership undermined the drive for con-
tributions; only 20,000 tonnes were raised to the normal stock, for a
total initial buffer stock of 40,000." This shortfall was unfortunate be-
cause the condition of the market was worsening. At the end of the
Fifth Agreement, the world plunged into its worst recession in fifty
years. The world's production of tin metal had slightly exceeded con-
sumption since 1978. In 1981, however, consumption fell to eighty-five
per cent of production.7 Incredibly, the Council ignored these omens
and authorized a further increase in the price band in late 1981. To
support the new floor it imposed strict export controls in April, 1982.
The Council of the Sixth Agreement resolved to continue the price sup-
port program of the Fifth.s0
The attainment of a Sixth Agreement did not forestall attempts by
producing countries to organize themselves into a better defined bloc.
Months after the Sixth Agreement entered into force, seven producing
countries combined to form the Association of Tin Producing Countries
(A.T.P.C.).8 ' The main goal of the A.T.P.C. was "to obtain remunera-
tive and equitable returns to tin producers and adequate supplies to
consumers at fair and stable prices."' 2 The A.T.P.C. had a wide range
of potential powers "to establish the necessary institutional and finan-
cial arrangements so as to overcome the problems facing the tin indus-
try." 83 Notwithstanding the ambitious tone of the A.T.P.C.'s constitu-
tion, the association did not immediately play an active role in the tin
market.84
77. Id. art. 60.
78. Memorandum of the D.T.I., supra note 57, at 50.
79. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 16.
80. Memorandum of the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 50.
81. Agreement Establishing the Association of Tin Producing Countries, done at
London, Mar. 29, 1983, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1009 (1984). The seven producing
countries which are members of this Association are Bolivia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Ni-
geria, Thailand, Zaire and Australia. Id.
82. Id. art. 1, at 1009.
83. Id. art. 2.
84. McFadden, supra note 21, at 820.
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B. EFFECTIVENESS
The I.T.C. was very active between 1956 and 1985. The Council im-
posed export control for over one-quarter of its life and conducted
buffer stock activity for over three-quarters of it.8" Its effect on the
market, however, has been the subject of considerable debate. 01jec-
tively, the record of the I.T.C. has been hardly perfect: in its first
twenty-three years it failed to keep the market price within its target
band for seventy-nine months, an effectiveness rate of only seventy per
cent.86 The buffer stock even ran out of money in a vain defense of the
floor in 1958.87 Unlike its descendant thirty years later, however, the
I.T.C. was not thereby insolvent. It had no bank debt, few, if any, trad-
ing liabilities, and possessed substantial assets in the form of its tin
holdings.
Some commentators have suggested that the I.T.A. was substantially
effective in stabilizing the tin market.8 8 Others, led by Smith and
Schink, who published a detailed study in 1976, have held that the
Council's seventy per cent ratio not only demonstrates the Council's
lack of success, but is misleadingly high. Smith and Schink concluded
that the buffer stock has been much too small to exert more than a
minor influence on the market and that the manner of the Council's
application of export controls may have actually destabilized the mar-
ket; they credit such stability as did exist in the tin market more to the
timing of sales of tin from the larger United States strategic stockpile
than to the operations of the I.T.C.s9
III. THE CRISIS
A. THE BUILD-UP
For tin producers, 1985 began with the market in the doldrums.
Consumption of- tin metal had barely recovered from the trough of
85. Memorandum of the D.T.I., supra note 57, at 151-62.
86. Id.
87. Memorandum of the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 49.
88. See, e.g., W. Fox, supra note 3, at 389; The Role of International Commodity
Agreements or Arrangements in Attaining the Objective of the Integrated Programme
for Commodities, UNCTAD (Agenda Item 2) at 17, U.N. Dc. TD/B/C.1/270
(1985) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Commodity Agreements] (indicating that tin prices
have coincided with I.T.A. predictions in spite of such destabilizing factors as the tin
policies of the Soviet Union and the United States); Amlft, 1985 and All That, TiN
INT'L, June 1988, at 11 (declaring the I.T.C. an example of a successful international
commodity agreement during its first twenty years).
89. Smith & Schink, The International Tin Agreement: A Reassessment, 86 Eco,.
J. 715 (1976); see Memorandum of the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 50 (discussing the
contribution of tin metal to the buffer stock).
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1982. To make matters worse, the volume of tin entering the market
was reasonably high and expected to increase. The United States was
continuing to sell from its strategic stockpile. The export controls suf-
fered by members of the I.T.C. failed to have their desired effect of
starving the market of new metal. While the member countries had
reduced the volume of their exports by almost forty per cent for three
years, non-member countries and smugglers in member countries had
drastically augmented their exports in order to appropriate larger
shares of the market. Brazil, in particular, had increased its exports by
over fifty per cent in 1984 to 14,278 tonnes, an amount equivalent to
over ten per cent of the world's total exports for that year. Smugglers
in Southeast Asia released a similar volume of tin to the market in
1984. Canada was expected to open its first tin mine later in the year.
With these stimuli, the tin price maintained its pressure on the floor of
the I.T.C.'s target band.9 0
The price only remained above the floor because the Council had
intervened heavily in the market. The buffer stock had been very active
since 1981, making enormous purchases of tin: 51,665 tonnes in 1982,
2,415 in 1983 and 6,727 in 1984.91 In addition, purchases for ware-
housing was not the Council's only way of supporting the price. The
buffer stock also became increasingly active in paper trades, strategi-
cally buying and selling tin futures in order to manipulate the
market."2
Unfortunately for the Council, protecting the floor price by purchas-
ing vast tonnages of tin on the L.M.E. had not only been exceedingly
expensive, but became more so per tonne between 1982 and 1985.
When the United States dollar soared against the pound sterling, so did
the Malaysian ringgit. The floor price went from an equivalent price of
£7,000 per tonne in July 1982 to over £10,000 per tonne in early
1985.11 The Council had made most of its financial arrangements in
90. See Sulong, Malaysia Accuses Brazil of 'No Positive Response', Fin. Times,
May 17, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter Sulong, Malaysia Accuses] (addressing the factors
that were depressing the tin market and causing the collapse of the industry); Sulong,
Tin Market in Doldrums, Fin. Times, Feb. 13, 1985, at 36 (discussing the effects of
the export cartels on the tin industry); I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 16-17, 35
(detailing world tin production, consumption, and trade statistics).
91. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 46.
92. Two techniques increasingly used to tie up tin from the market were "special
lends" and "special borrows." See Memorandum of the Ring Dealers, supra note 7, at
84-85 (defining these practices as agreements between the Council and the brokers to
simultaneously sell (or buy) tin on the spot market and buy (or sell) back the same
amount forward).
93. See Report by the Buffer Stock Manager (Sept. 20, 1985), reprinted in Sac-
OND REPORT II, supra note 7, app., at 239 [hereinafter Buffer Stock Manager] (stat-
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pounds sterling and found its resources depleting fast.
It was public knowledge that the Council had been supported by sub-
stantial bank loans and was making extensive forward trades; what was
not well known was exactly how these items all added up. By the begin-
ning of 1985, the Council's exposure had caused great unease in certain
quarters, primarily those with the desire and enhanced access to infor-
mation to be able to do the arithmetic. One of the first entities afflicted
by this inquietude was the Bank of England, which monitors markets in
the City of London with a critical eye. In observing the L.M.E., the
Bank for months had been concerned about the Council's exposure.
The Bank, however, felt it was in a difficult position. Although charged
with regulating much of the financial system of the country, the Bank
was not responsible for commodity exchanges or the Council. Lacking
formal authority to tackle the apparent problem and not wishing to
precipitate a crisis in a matter outside of its bailiwick, the Bank con-
tented itself with uttering discreet expressions of concern to the
L.M.E., the government, and anyone else who asked for its opinion.
Officials of the Bank met with the management of the L.M.E. a num-
ber of times to discuss the operations of the Councilf 4 The minutes of
one of the first meetings, held in February 1984, illustrates the exis-
tence of early concern over the solvency of the Council and the likeli-
hood of the member states covering any financial shortfall:
It was still not known how long [the buffer stock manager] could continue to
finance his support operations particularly if there were to be some strengthening
of sterling against the dollar. The LME representatives expressed no formal anx-
iety concerning the Buffer Stock; it was an on-going commercial operation and
they would continue to monitor the market. The Chairman [who was an official
of the Bank] emphasized that in the event of the BSM's funds becoming ex-
hausted, it should not be assumed that any government would step in to provide
additional finance.9 5
The Bank of England also informed the British Department of Trade
ing that the value of currencies demands consideration when addressing provisions for
modifying prices in the Sixth International Tin Agreement).
94. Letter from Mr. R. Leigh-Pemberton, Governor of the Bank of England, to the
Chairman of the Trade and Industry Committee (July 1, 1986), reprinted in FIRST
REPORT, supra note 71, app. 2, at 47 (advising the committee that a meeting was held
between the Bank of England and the L.M.E to discuss buffer stock transactions);
Testimony of Mr. C.J. Farrow, Bank of England (Oct. 22, 1986), reprinted in FIRST
REPORT, supra note 71, at 18-32 [hereinafter Farrow Testimony] (testifying that the
Bank of England had little power over the L.M.E after the end of exchange control).
95. Extract from the Minutes of the Liaison Meeting between the Bank of England
and Representatives of the London Metal Exchange (Feb. 22. 1984), reprinted in
FIRST REPORT, supra note 71, app. 2 Annex, at 47.
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and Industry of its opinion at the time.96
If the L.M.E. was not distressed in February 1984, it very soon be-
came so after its own assessment of the situation.97 The L.M.E., how-
ever, found itself in a dilemma similar to that of the Bank of England.
The Exchange believed that it could do little about the Council because
it only possessed the power to regulate its own members. The Council
was not a member of the L.M.E., but a customer of at least thirteen
members. The brokers themselves would have to manage the relation-
ship between the Council and the L.M.E.9 8 Certain members of the
L.M.E. approached the Bank of England "and asked if there was a
subject for concern, and the Bank confirmed that they should have a
concern.""9 A few brokers acted on this concern by declining to accept
further trading business of-and hence the credit risk of dealing
with-the Council. 100
The fact of, let alone the extent of, official concern over the financial
condition of the buffer stock of the Council did not reach the general
public's notice in the first half of 1985. Indeed, little word filtered out
of, in the language of one official inquisitor in 1986, "the magic circle"
of the L.M.E., the Bank of England, and the British Department of
Trade and Industry.' This silence was not only prompted by perceived
jurisdictional incapacities, but also by these entities' inability to ascer-
tain the extent of the Council's difficulties. The Council had resisted
supplying detailed current information on its buffer stock operations,
even to its own members.102
96. See Farrow Testimony, supra note 94, at 22 (stressing that the Bank of Eng-
land disclosed to the Department of Trade and Industry the existence of a problem).
97. Id.
98. Testimony of J. Lion, Chairman of the L.M.E. (Jan. 29, 1986) [hereinafter
Lion Testimony], reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 51-56.
99. Farrow Testimony, supra note 94, at 29.
100. Lion Testimony, supra note 98, at 53.
101. See Testimony of C.J. Farrow, Bank of England (Oct. 22, 1986), reprinted in
FIRST REPORT, supra note 71, at 18 (referring to the communications between the
regulators).
102. Access to information on the operations of the buffer stock was potentially
lucrative for an inside trader. The I.T.C. interpreted the I.T.A.'s requirement that such
information be confidential as compelling it to retain much of this information from its
individual members. Instead, the Buffer Stock Manager submitted edited quarterly re-
ports to the members months in arrears. Some members, including the United King-
dom and the E.C., believed the information they were receiving to be insufficient to
assess the Council's activities and in 1983 attempted to reform the information process.
The members could not agree on such changes and the initiative foundered. Testimony
of M.A.R. Lunn, Assistant Secretary, Department of Trade and Industry (Feb. 19,
1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 171, 173; Note submitted by
DTI officials on certain legal aspects of operations of the International Tin Council(Mar. 4, 1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, app., at 189-92.
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The Council itself had good reason for suppressing this information,
for it was very aware of its impending difficulties. The officials of the
I.T.C. had frequently informed its members that it could not continue
indefinitely to defend the floor price without additional resources. In
May 1985, the Executive Chairman of the Council warned the mem-
bers that in the absence of effective controls, a collapse in the market
and the resulting insolvency of the Council was distinctly possible.1 0 3
The alternatives open to the Council in mid-1985 were fourfold: (1)
to suspend defence of the floor and watch the market price crash
through it; (2) to reduce the floor to a level where it could be defended
on a sustainable basis; (3) to receive additional contributions from
members to finance its current operations; or (4) to tighten export con-
trols. Certain consuming members, such as Canada, recommended that
the I.T.C. lower its price floor.104 Certain producing members, notably
Malaysia, were adamantly opposed to any price reduction.10 Producing
countries were equally reluctant to impose more stringent export con-
trols because, not only would these bring hardship to their industries,
but also might prove ineffective if non-members increased their own
exports to take up the slack.108 If export controls were the answer, non-
members would have to participate in the scheme.
Entreaties to Brazil by its fellow producers to restrain its exports or
even join the Agreement failed. 0 7 Brazil did not want the dictates of
an international body to hobble its young tin industry. The Council,
103. The Executive Chairman wrote:
Given the position on consumption, production capacity and stocks outlined
above, no economic provisions would lead to the collapse of the market and the
industry. If the market were to collapse, the Council would not have sufficient
security in the form of tin warrants to cover its debts to the banks and the banks
could be expected to sell the tin they hold as security, thus further depressing
prices. Whilst it would not be possible to predict the level to which prices would
fall, it is likely that there would not be sufficient tin to cover the debt, leaving a
residual amount owing to both the banks and to the market by the Council. In
the final analysis, this would have to be met by Members of the Council.
Elements for Consideration in the Negotiations of the Seventh International Tin
Agreement (May 10, 1985), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, app., at
233, 235.
104. See Testimony of Mr. B. Leeming, former Acting Buffer Stock Manager
(Feb. 19, 1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 135, 142 (testifying
that the Canadians felt the membership should have examined the situation and re-
duced the floor to correspond with the market pressure).
105. Id.; Edwards, Tin Buffer Stock May Trade Below Floor Price, Fin. Times,
Mar. 29, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter Edwards, Tin Buffer Stock].
106. See Sulong, Tin Market in Doldrums, supra note 90, at 36 (discussing the
I.T.C. members' experience with export restrictions).
107. See Sulong, Malaysia Accuses, supra note 90, at 36 (discussing Malaysia's
Minister of Primary Industries warning to Brazil that failure to curb its production and
exports might lead to a collapse of the tin market).
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needing to do something else, settled for a half-measure. At the end of
March 1985, the Council gave the Buffer Stock Manager the authority
to operate below the floor, but would not lower it.108 The allocation of
votes and the requirement for a two-thirds distributed majority for sig-
nificant changes meant that Malaysia alone could block any proposed
movement in the floor, however desirable such a change might seem to
the other members.
This withdrawal from determined defense of the floor might have
stabilized the Council's situation. Unfortunately, the Bank of England's
fears about the effects of an appreciation of the pound sterling against
the United States dollar were about to come true. In April and May
the pound recovered sharply, causing the L.M.E. price of tin to fall.
This would have been good news for the Council had it been in a condi-
tion to pay cash for tin, but it could no longer do so. The I.T.C. had
exhausted its cash some time ago and attempted to control the market
by juggling its tin stocks, bank loans, and futures contracts. The dimi-
nution in the sterling value of tin meant that the value of the tin held
as security by the Council's creditors also fell, making the creditors
uneasy. Many banks requested the Council to grant additional tin as
security and balked at advancing further sums. Metal traders handling
the Council's contracts also called for increased margin payments. The
Buffer Stock Manager could not come up with all of the required col-
lateral. Certain traders subsequently were persuaded to accept low
margins.1"9
The putative regulators, observing the tin market from the sidelines,
wrung their hands with increasing frequency but did little else. Fearful
of the enormous political repercussions that could follow a collapse of
the Council, Department of Trade and Industry officials met with the
L.M.E. management in June to inform the Exchange that "no likely
hope of a British government guarantee being offered existed against
the default of the Buffer Stock Manager." The Department also asked
the L.M.E. about the possibility of warning its members about dealing
with the Buffer Stock Manager; the Exchange once again took the po-
sition that it had no power either to issue such a warning or to enforce
108. Edwards, Tin Buffer Stock, supra note 105, at 36. The breach of the floor
enabled the Buffer Stock Manager to do three things: to break the link between the
Malaysian market and the L.M.E. and save itself from expenditures motivated purely
by exchange rate fluctuations; to punish speculators against the Council's ability to
maintain the floor; and to sell tin at market prices to finance its operations. See Ed-
wards, Price Tactics Undermine Tin Pact, Fin. Times, May 17, 1985, at 36 (analyzing
the impetus behind the breach of the floor).
109. Memorandum of the D.T.I., supra note 57, at 147; Memorandum of the Ring
Dealers, supra note 7, at 85-86.
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one. Despite its importance, the Department did not express its mes-
sage to the banks or the tin mining companies in the United King-
dom.110 The Bank of England likewise did not warn the banks, as it
"[did] not set itself up to advise commercial banks about risks. That is
for their judgment in their lending." ''
By late summer, 1985, word of the dire financial straits of the Coun-
cil leaked out of the "magic circle." Eminent authorities on the tin
market, including a senior official of the West German Ministry of Ec-
onomics and a prominent metal broker, perceived the Council to be on
the verge of insolvency and predicted that the Agreement might not be
renewed."1 2
This wave of concern inspired diplomatic action to resolve the Coun-
cil's problems. In a report dated September 20, 1985, the Buffer Stock
Manager urged the members to keep the Council in business by meet-
ing its costs of financing the stock, awaiting further improvement in the
economy, and trying to reach an effective accord with non-member pro-
ducers. The cost of continued operation, he believed, was less than that
which would be incurred by tin industries in the event of a market
collapse. He implored the members to stop "gambling on its good for-
tune" and provide the Council with adequate funds. If not all the mem-
bers were prepared to share the financing cost, then he hoped that at
least those who directly benefitted most from the present price level
would. 3 Those who directly benefitted responded to the call. In mid-
September, the A.T.P.C. agreed to formulate plans to inject £60 mil-
lion into the Council.1 14
B. INSOLVENCY AND RESCUE ATTEMPTS
The deliberations of the Council and the A.T.P.C. over the proposed
manner of rescue proceeded slowly. Unfortunately, time was running
out fast. In mid-October the buffer stock showed signs of being in ex-
tremis. One producer country volunteered to resuscitate it with an
110. See Testimony of the Rt. Hon. P. Channon & M.A.R. Lunn (Mar. 19, 1986),
reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 223, 227-99 (stating that the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industries did not warn the banks and United Kingdom mining
companies, but did warn the tin brokers).
I II. Farrow Testimony, supra note 94, at 29.
112. See Gowers, Economist Attacks Tin Pact, Fin. Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at 18
(stating that price supports have kept production high); see also Cut Urged in Tin
Support Price, Fin. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at 40.
113. Buffer Stock Manager, supra note 93, at 240.
114. See Stainer, Producers Move to Shore-up Tin Price, The Guardian (London),
Sept. 30, 1985, at 23 (examining the cause of rising production of tin and the I.T.C.
efforts).
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early installment on its expected contribution," 5 but never advanced
any money. This delay in payment proved too much for the Council's
bankers, who froze the Council's credit lines and demanded immediate
resolution of its indebtedness. The Council, now utterly insolvent, could
only suspend its operations. On the morning of October 24, 1985, the
Buffer Stock Manager telephoned the L.M.E. to tell the exchange that
the buffer stock was suspending its operations for lack of funds. Given
the situation's gravity, the L.M.E. immediately informed its members
and suspended trading in tin. 1 ' The Kuala Lumpur Commodity Ex-
change followed suit."'
The I.T.C.'s capitulation and the Exchange's suspension of trading
sent shock waves throughout the mining and financial worlds. Reac-
tions ranged from incredulity to cynicism. To those not intimately at-
tuned to the situation-practically everyone outside of the "magic cir-
cle", the banks, and the other member governments-the abrupt
insolvency of the I.T.C. came as a surprise. They could not believe that
an international economic organization backed by most of the world's
richest countries might not be immune from that affliction dreaded by
all commercial enterprises in the capitalist system: sudden strangula-
tion by unsatisfied creditors. Others saw the termination of the buffer
stock's operations as yet another round in the eternal and tiresome
wrangle between participants in the tin market; the participants were
merely jockeying for position and waiting for high-level meetings to
find a solution. The experiences of other international organizations
which had previously run out of cash confirmed the latter view: all had
happy endings. 18 All eyes were now fixed on the Council and its
115. Tin Council Receives Early Cash Payment, Fin. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at 40.
116. See Wagstyl, Tin Market in Crisis as London Trading is Halted, Fin. Times,
Oct. 25, 1985, at 1 (explaining the consequences which drove the council to suspend
trading in tin); see also Memorandum of the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 43 (describing
the process by which the Buffer Stock Manager suspended trading on October 25,
1985). See generally Wagstyl, World Tin Market at the Brink, Fin. Times, Oct. 25,
1985, at 1 (detailing the causes of and repercussions from the trading suspension).
117. See Wagstyl, Sherwell & Sulong, Tin Trade Suspended Until Council Meets
Next Week, Fin. Times, Oct. 26, 1985, at 11 (detailing the repercussions of the halt in
trading).
118. Apart from the previous and temporary difficulties of the I.T.A. and other
commodity agreements, at least two such precedents of international organizations run-
ning out of money exist. In both cases assessment of additional contributions from
member states provided the solution. The first was the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF) in 1961. Some members refused to pay their contributions to UNEF
and S200 million worth of United Nations bonds, half of which the United States pur-
chased, financed the deficit. The second precedent is that of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the 1980s. The United
States and the United Kingdom withdrew from it, taking with them thirty per cent of
its revenues. UNESCO's allegedly free-spending ways could not be sustained and it
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members." 9
The bickering that for years had been confined to the board room of
the I.T.C. was now played out on the pages of the world's financial
press. Many consuming countries, led by West Germany, expressed a
preference for a lower tin price rather than a bail-out of the Council.
Other consumers wanted to rescue the Council, but could not agree on
how to do it. Producing countries were also divided. While Indonesia
quickly pledged a contribution, Malaysia was loath to pay for a rescue.
True to form, the Council was deadlocked. With apparent contempt for
the urgency of the situation, the only decision the Council could make
was to adjourn its meetings for two weeks.1 20 The banks, which had
precipitated the crisis in the hope of forcing an immediate response
from member governments, got their bitter first taste of the interna-
tional politics of tin.
As the crisis entered its second week without an obvious rescue forth-
coming, nervousness began to spread beyond the members of the Coun-
cil and the creditor banks and brokers. There were three other groups
of interested parties in the crisis, of different degrees of proximity to
the Council. The first consisted of tin producing firms, who would have
to scale down mining operations and lose profits after a price col-
lapse.1 2' The second group were entities which dealt with creditors of
the Council, which feared a "domino effect" if the creditors were
forced to default on their commitments. This group mostly comprised
metal brokers on the L.M.E. which either had not dealt with the Coun-
cil or could absorb any losses from its failure; they feared that the
Council's insolvency would precipitate failures of weaker members of
the L.M.E. which, given the interlocking web of principals' contracts
between members, might set off a chain reaction of unsatisfied commit-
needed restructuring. In these cases, any problems of third party creditors did not come
to the fore. Y. BEIGBEDER, MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZA-
TIONS: REFORM OR DECLINE? 26-35, 147-48 (London 1987).
119. See Stainer, LME Waits for International Action, Guardian (London), Oct.
26, 1985, at 18 (reviewing the options available to the I.T.C. for restoring the market).
120. See Wagstyl & Bunker, Tin Trading Remains Suspended as ITC Fails to
Solve Crisis, Fin. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at 1 (discussing the l.T.C.'s inability to decide
upon a course of action); Cooke, Tin Council Must Continue, Say Indonesians, Fin.
Times, Nov. 2, 1985, at 2 (explaining that because tin exports account for a large
percentage of Indonesia's export revenues, they were willing to pledge S5 million to the
I.T.C.); Davies & Peel, Bonn Under Fire on Tin Crisis, Fin. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at
40 (discussing the effect of the tin crisis on the E.C.).
121. The price of the shares of the world's leading private tin producing firm,
Paranapanema S.A., fell by half on the So Paulo Stock Exchange within two weeks of
the Council's suspension. See Whitley, Brazil Refuses to Join Tin Pact, Fin. Times,
Nov. 8, 1985, at 34 [hereinafter Whitley, Brazil Refuses] (describing Brazil's role in
the tin industry and in the collapse of the I.T.C.).
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ments and pull them all down.122
The third group of persons affected was only slightly more remote:
the participants in the other commodity markets, especially those pro-
ducing and trading other metals. Concerned about the possible eco-
nomic and financial implications of tin's collapse-the future prices of
metals and other commodities governed by international agreement as
well as the solvency of individual brokers-purchasers withdrew from
the markets. This withdrawal, in turn, had two effects. One, prices of
other metals fell, reducing the incomes of mining and metals firms.123
Two, the volume of trading on the L.M.E. diminished by at least half,
paring incomes of brokers. 24 To add to the L.M.E.'s troubles, the Ma-
laysian market soon re-opened and siphoned off much of the remaining
tin trading;125 the L.M.E. feared that even if it survived the crisis any
business lost might never return. 26 With the banks facing severe loan
losses, the very existence of the L.M.E. threatened, and mining firms
contemplating lower profits, the I.T.C.'s insolvency indeed caused
"mayhem in the City of London.' 27
In the absence of leadership from the Council, the creditors scram-
bled to shore-up their individual and collective positions. In the first
round of what was to become an exceedingly long, complex, and expen-
sive legal contest, a broker creditor of the Council won an injunction
from the English High Court restraining the Council from disposing of
its assets.28 This injunction was later struck down on the grounds that
the Council was immune from the Court's jurisdiction by virtue of the
I.T.C. (Immunities and Privileges) Order of 1972.129 On October 31,
122. See Wagstyl, The Crisis No One is Ready to Resolve, Fin. Times, Nov. 1,
1985, at 22 (analyzing the conflicting interests present in the I.T.C. and their inability
to resolve the crisis).
123. A leading nickel producer requested the L.M.E. also to suspend trading in
that metal because the tin crisis was artificially depressing world nickel prices. LME
Postpones Decision on Tin Trading Restart, Fin. Times, Nov. 1, 1985, at 1; Another
major producer suspended sales of lead and copper because of low L.M.E. prices. Wag-
styl, Tin Council Advances Emergency Meeting After Brittan Appeal, Fin. Times,
Nov. 2, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Wagstyl, Tin Council Advances]. See Stainer, Tin Cri-
sis Depresses Other Metals, The Guardian (London), Nov. 25, 1985, at 21 (reporting
that trading on the London Metal Exchange decreased of fifty per cent as a result of
the tin crisis).
124. Memorandum from the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 47.
125. Wagstyl & Sulong, Tin Council Fails to Resolve Crisis, Fin. Times, Nov. 7,
1985, at 1; Malaysia Reopens Tin Mart, Int'l Herald-Tribune, Feb. 4, 1986, at 9.
126. Lion Testimony, supra note 98, at 56.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Wagstyl, Tin Council Advances, supra note 123, at 1.
129. See Wagstyl, Court Backs Tin Council Immunity, Fin. Times, Jan. 16, 1986,
at 40 [hereinafter Wagstyl, Court Backs Tin] (discussing the I.T.C.'s additional vic-
tory over Arab Banking Corporation that was attempting to prevent the Council from
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1985, the L.M.E. brokers met to discuss the problem; the Bank of Eng-
land called a meeting of the banks.130 The banks formed a committee
to explore solutions to the crisis and within days proposed one: they
offered the Council one year's grace in loan payments. In return, they
asked that the A.C.T.P. countries make the planned cash contributions
and the member governments give guarantees of the Council's out-
standing indebtedness as well as pledge to keep the Council in funds
until its operations could wind up in an orderly fashion."31
The ball was lobbed firmly back into the Council's court, but once
again, the Council did not react like the team it was supposed to be.
Few members evinced a desire to play the game with any seriousness.
Spurred by its special interests in preserving the health of the L.M.E.
and the tin mines in Cornwall, the British government was the first to
leap up. The Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry an-
nounced that the United Kingdom would not only honor its share of the
Council's debts, but would launch a diplomatic initiative to enlist other
governments, especially those of fellow E.C. countries, to make similar
commitments. 32 Many of the E.C. countries found this solution unac-
ceptable, believing that the Council was an independent commercial
undertaking and that they were not obliged to save it.13 3 Malaysia also
dragged its feet.134 Outside the beleaguered Council, Brazil once again
rejected the role of white knight.1 35
The banks sensed their proposal of early November was not going to
succeed and at the urging of the Bank of England replaced it with a
more comprehensive one.13 6 Led by Standard Chartered Bank, the
banks offered the Council not only forbearance but new money. The
banks would advance £550 million for three years at market rates to
enable the Council to meet its commitments to brokers. In return, the
banks wanted something from everyone: guarantees of the Council's in-
debtedness from its member governments, a deposit of tin from the
Council equal to ten per cent of the value of the new loan, and a guar-
transferring assets).
130. R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 16.
131. See Wagstyl, Banks Set Terms for Helping to Solve Tin Market Crisis, Fin.
Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at 1 (setting forth the terms under which a group of sixteen
financial institutions were willing to assist in resolving the tin market crisis); Memoran-
dum of Sir Adam Ridley (Jan. 29, 1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note
7, at 22 [hereinafter Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley].
132. Wagstyl, Tin Council Advances, supra note 123, at 1.
133. Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley, supra note 131, at 25-26; Hermann, UK
and Bonn Differ on Tin Wrangle, Fin. Times, Nov. 28, 1985. at 40.
134. Brinkmanship in Tin Market, Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at 40.
135. Whitley, Brazil Refuses, supra note 121, at 34.
136. R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 18.
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antee of ten per cent of indebtedness from the L.M.E."3 '
Although the L.M.E. immediately indicated its approval of this
scheme, the Council did not. Incredibly, the Council's deliberations on
its plight had an air of unreality about them. The memorandum to
members from the Executive Chairman reviewing the banks' proposal
revealed that the Council's officers believed it still had considerable
freedom of action. The memorandum suggested that the Council had
three options: to "walk away from the Council's debts;" "state that the
Council would meet reasonable residual debts and have an orderly
winding up of buffer stock operations;" or "continue buffer stock opera-
tions on a limited basis supporting a lower price."138 The "Decisions for
the Council" were nonchalantly reduced into one sentence: "[w]hether
to pay reasonable debts; and if so, how this should be financed."139 The
Council then did what it did best, postpone the decision until further
meetings could be held in a few weeks. 40
By this time, with no resolution in sight, the crisis began to throw up
its first casualties. The dreaded chain-reaction of failures of brokers on
the L.M.E. appeared about to begin. The Council had not paid MMC
Metals Ltd., a subsidiary of the state-owned Malaysia Mining Corpo-
ration, for a large sale of tin and MMC was forced to default on £13.9
million of obligations to another broker. MMC was compelled to go
into liquidation. "1
Producers also began to suffer as the tin price dived by one third, to
the equivalent of about £6,000 per tonne on the minor markets, and
kept on sliding. This made mine after mine redundant; many closed
and more prepared to do So.14 2 Frustration at the longevity of the crisis
extended across all borders and party lines. In the United Kingdom this
frustration found a familiar outlet in demands for an official inquiry.14 3
The House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry was
duly charged with the task of determining both the origins of the crisis
137. Wagstyl, Tin Council Considers Bank's Crisis Plan, Fin. Times, Nov. 16,
1985, at 20 [hereinafter Tin Council Considers]; Memorandum from the L.M.E.,
supra note 60, at 23; Memorandum of the D.T.I., supra note 57, at 105-6.
138. Memorandum from the L.M.E., supra note 60, at 23.
139. Cessation of Buffer Stock Operations-Options, Statement by Executive
Chairman (Nov. 26, 1985), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note 7, at 241-43.
140. Wagstyl & Gowers, Tin Council to Meet 'Until Decision Reached' on Debt,
Fin. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at 1.
141. Wagstyl, Living in the Shadow of an Avalanche, Fin. Times, Nov. 21, 1985,
at 28; Wagstyl, Tin Council Considers, supra note 137, at 20; Wagstyl, Malaysian
Trader Suspends Dealings on LME, Fin. Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at 44.
142. Geevor Warns of Lay-offs, Fin. Times, Dec. 5, 1985, at 29; Malaysia Urges
LME to Fix Prices on Outstanding Tin Contracts, Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at 40.
143. Riddell, Inquiry Sought Into Tin Crisis, Fin. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at 48.
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and the appropriate response of the British government. It began sum-
moning persons and documents in earnest, but soon found that the key
witness wished to remain mute-the Council refused "to attend to give
evidence or to release any information to the Committee," preferring to
cower behind its cloak of immunity in the United Kingdom.'"
Ultimately, the Council's testimony was not completely necessary be-
cause its darkest secret seeped out on its own. In early December the
City obtained a copy of the Council's auditors' confidential report on
the Council's finances as of October 24, 1985. To governments, bank-
ers, brokers, and miners alike the report on the Buffer Stock Manager's
handiwork proved a terrifying read. The report put the gross amount of
the Council's liabilities at £897 million, significantly higher than had
been expected. The Council owed one-third of this sum to sixteen finan-
cial institutions and the rest to the brokers. To make matters worse, the
volume of its stocks of tin was also high. In addition to the 52,540
tonnes it held in its own name, it controlled 26,845 tonnes held in the
name of banks and brokers. The Council's forward purchases amounted
to 63,504 tonnes. 141
Two unhappy conclusions were drawn from this assessment. First, it
implied that after making adjustments for those contracts which had
been priced, 120,819 tonnes of tin-equal to eight months of world
consumption-now had to be valued and likely sold. A difficult task in
a confident and liquid market, this was impossible in a skeptical and
thin one. This report also appeared to be a numerical indictment of the
Buffer Stock Manager's discharge of his responsibilities: under his di-
rection, the buffer stock controlled a larger volume of tin than the
I.T.A. authorized.146
Dismayed by this revelation, the creditors of the Council primed
their writs.1 47 Three brokers on the L.M.E. with outstanding trades
with the Council commenced the arbitration proceedings to which they
were entitled by the Headquarters Agreement. 8 The brokers, how-
ever, indicated their willingness to compromise on the Council's debts.
144. Riddell & Wagstyl, Memorandum submitted by Geevor Tin Mines (Jan. 22,
1986), reprinted in SECOND REFPORT II, supra note 7, at 1; Tin Council Shuns Com-
mons Investigation, Fin. Times, Dec. 5, 1985, at 48.
145. Wagstyl, Opening a Tin Can of Worms, Fin. Times, Dec. 4, 1985, at 32; R.
GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 14-15. Its control was pursuant to the terms of "spe-
cial lends" and "special borrows." See supra note 92.
146. R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 14-15.
147. Tin Council Creditors Prepare for Court Action, Fin. Times, Dec. 9, 1985, at
4.
148. Wagstyl, Brokers in Arbitration Proceedings Against Tin Council, Fin.
Times, Dec. 7, 1985, at 20.
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The banks demanded complete recovery, but also tried in earnest to
meet with officials of the Council to hammer out a mutually acceptable
solution. These officials appeared to be in no hurry to do so.'49
The diplomatic efforts of the British government were supplemented
with those of the Commission of the E.C., but only forced two incon-
clusive informal meetings between the Council and its creditors in early
December.' 50 Just before Christmas, the Council, or more accurately
the blocs within it, managed to make a decision on the rescue proposal
which had sat on the table for weeks. They soundly rejected the plan,
for two reasons: one, to them it required a virtual admission of the
members' liability for the Council's debts; and two, it was too expen-
sive. Most members would only partake in a rescue if it required no
admission of liability and if all the creditors shared the burden. 15 Af-
ter these announcements, the Council adjourned its meetings for three
weeks.152
The banks, never eager to formulate rescue plans for recalcitrant cli-
ents, let alone share their burdens, swallowed their outrage at the con-
duct of the Council and gave it "one more go." Thirteen out of the
fourteen banks, plus the brokers, were prepared to implement another,
more imaginative proposal. In the belief that the I.T.C. had demon-
strated a lamentable incapacity to manage its way out of the crisis, the
scheme would establish another entity to take over the Council's assets
and liabilities. This new company, "Newco," would wind up the Coun-
cil's operations in an orderly fashion by releasing its stocks of tin onto
the market over a three year period. It would be supported in the in-
terim by an equity infusion of £270 million-£200 million from the
governments, £50 million from the L.M.E. brokers and £20 million
from the banks-and new loans from Standard Chartered Bank guar-
anteed in part by the British government. This proposal represented a
serious attempt by the creditors to deal with the expressed concerns of
the member states; in supporting a separate entity with equity capital,
the members would not be directly repaying the Council's debts and
could also cap their losses. The members received the Newco proposal
before Christmas, with an urgent request for prompt attention. 5 3
149. Wagstyl, Tin Council Adjourns Until Next Wednesday, Fin. Times, Dec. 13,
1985, at 28; Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley, supra note 131, at 24-26.
150. Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley, supra note 131, at 25-26.
151. Wagstyl, Tin Move Rejected, Fin. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, at 36; Peel & Wag-
styl, EEC Ministers Dash Hopes of Tin Crisis Settlement, Fin. Times, Dec. 18, 1985,
at 24; Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley, supra note 131, at 26.
152. Wagstyl, Tin Council Defers Crisis Talks for Three Weeks, Fin. Times, Dec.
21, 1985, at 3.
153. Fresh ITC Rescue Plan Proposed, Fin. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, at 16; Testi-
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Newco struck a responsive chord in many members. For the first
time, the Council resolved to formally negotiate with its creditors. 1" Its
first offer was £60 million, a sum the creditors thought far too low.'06
It was an encouraging sign, however, and to keep the process going, the
British government offered £50 million in cash if the other parties
would increase their commitments b6 In late February 1986, four
months after the buffer stock suspended its operations, the parties'
working groups agreed on the terms of a provisional plan to put to their
respective members. 57 After intense diplomatic pressure, most I.T.C.
members finally gave the plan their conditional support. Just when suc-
cess appeared imminent, however, Indonesia and Thailand vetoed the
plan on March 6, 1986. Indonesia stated that its share of the plan's
costs-£15 million-was not commensurate with its gains. 68 Ironi-
cally, this refusal came despite an attractive last-minute offer to Thai-
land and Indonesia by Paranapanema, the Brazilian company whose
production in 1985 was greater than that of Bolivia, to make a contri-
bution in cash and freeze its production level.'5 9
C. THE FALL-OUT
With all hope for settlement thus dashed, the market could hold its
breath no longer. The banks' united front had frayed during the negoti-
ations,1 60 but now fell apart-with Standard Chartered first off the
mony of Mr. P. Graham (Jan. 29, 1986), reprinted in SECOND REPORT II, supra note
7, at 34-35.
154. Wagstyl, Tin Council Prepared to Negotiate with Creditors, Fin. Times, Jan.
25, 1986, at 18.
155. Wagstyl, Tin Council Offers Creditors £60m Towards Rescue, Fin. Times,
Feb. 6, 1986, at 36.
156. Gowers, UK Offers £50m to Rescue Tin Market, Fin. Times, Feb. 7, 1986, at
36.
157. Wagstyl, Tin Rescue Package Agreed, Fin. Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at 1.
158. Various reasons have been suggested why Indonesia reversed its earlier enthu-
siasm for a rescue and rejected Newco. Indonesia's export earnings are very dependant
on petroleum and fell drastically in 1986, making it more difficult for Indonesia to
contribute. Indonesia and Thailand also might have wanted the opportunity to dispose
of high-cost producers, mainly Bolivia, once and for all. More likely, however, they did
not approve of a rescue which did not continue the Council's buffer stock operations
and most directly benefitted creditors. Wagstyl, Tin Crisis Deadline Extended, Fin.
Times, Mar. 6, 1986, at 40; see Rescue Plan for Tin Market Fails at Last Moment,
Fin. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at I (reporting the last moment failure of the rescue plan for
the tin market); B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS: A LEGAL
STUDY 212 (1987) (discussing the burden this payment would place on Indonesia).
159. Tin Prices Fall on Failure of ITC Rescue Plan, Int'l Herald-Tribune, Mar.
11, 1986, at 15.
160. One bank had made an unsuccessful application to the Court to stop the
Council from transferring its assets to Newco. Wagstyl, Court Backs Tin, supra note
129, at 40. At least three other banks sold the tin they held as collateral. Id.; Wagstyl,
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mark, the individual creditors started their own legal actions against
the Council.16'
For its part, the L.M.E. had postponed the unsavory task of untan-
gling the web of unperformed contracts between its members in the
hope that the task would be sweetened with rescue funds. The L.M.E.
now decided that the situation was so sensitive that it would maintain
the suspension of tin trading and impose a rule of the exchange to set-
tle all outstanding contracts, whether between members, or members
and clients, at a fixed price. Hoping to compromise between sellers who
wanted the October price maintained and buyers who wanted the low-
est current price stipulated, the L.M.E. fixed a price in the middle of
the current range of prices on other markets. This "ring-out" was held
at £6,250 per tonne at a special session of the Exchange on March 8,
1986. One broker firm which suffered at this "ring-out" decided not
only to take on the Council, but the L.M.E. itself. Shearson Lehman
launched an action in the English High Court claiming damages from
the L.M.E. for its conduct of the "ring-out.' 162
The initial legal problem facing the creditors was that while they had
known that the Council was a strange beast, they were not sure how to
grab a hold of it once it became unfriendly. The Council had resisted
submission to the inquiry of the House of Commons Select Committee
and the two asset freezing applications, on the basis that the 1972 Or-
der granted the Council immunity from suit and legal process in the
United Kingdom, unless it had waived that immunity. 16 3 When served
Another ITC Bank Breaks Ranks, Fin. Times, Mar. 5, 1986, at 36.
161. Wagstyl, Standard Chartered Begins Legal Action Against Tin Council, Fin.
Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at 1.
162. Wagstyl, Court Challenge Launched Against LME Tin Ruling, Fin. Times,
Mar. 11, 1986, at 1; Wagstyl, LME Braced for Lawsuits Over Decision on Tin, Fin.
Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at 1; Wagstyl & Owen, LME Ends Tin Trading and Sets Set-
tlement Price, Fin. Times, Mar. 8, 1986, at 1.
163. This immunity from suit did not necessarily extend to countries outside the
United Kingdom and certainly not to Malaysia and the United States). See Malaysian
Writ, Fin. Times, Jan. 15, 1987, at 41. Two Malaysian creditors of the Council sought
to enforce their security by court action and the Council pleaded immunity before the
High Court of Malaysia. Id. The Court held that the Council was not immune from
Malaysian process and allowed the writs to be served. Id.; Int'l Tin Council v. Amal-
gamet Inc., 524 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y.S.C. 1988); Ratner, International Tin Council v
Amalgamet Inc., 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 837, 837-40 (1988). A United States creditor of
the Council commenced arbitration proceedings in New York pursuant to its right
under trading contracts. Id. The Council applied to the New York Supreme Court for
a stay of arbitration proceedings on the grounds that it was immune from suit under
United Kingdom law and international comity. Id. The Court held that sovereign im-
munity in United States law is derived solely from two federal statutes, under whose
purview the Council did not come inter alia because the United States was not a mem-
ber of the Council. Id. The Headquarters Agreement was the source of the Council's
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with the writ of Standard Chartered Bank, the Council counter-at-
tacked with the same tactic and applied to have the writ set aside. Mr.
Justice Bingham confirmed the Council's general immunity in the
United Kingdom under the Order, but denied this plea based on the
terms of the loan document, a "facility letter." In the facility letter, the
Council had agreed to submit to the English High Court's jurisdiction
and in so doing had waived its immunity. Standard Chartered, there-
fore, could not be stopped from proceeding. 64
With the Council unlikely to have a further defense to Si,-ndard
Chartered's claim, the action could have proceeded quickly to -t, mmary
judgment and execution on the Council's unencumbered assets. In
scrambling for the Council's free assets, the bank would have had to
compete with two brokers: Maclaine Watson and Lazmet. Maclaine
Watson had just won an award of £3.25 million pursuant to the arbi-
tration clause in its contract with the Council and was preparing to
pounce."6 5 Lazmet was in the fortuitous position of having taken deliv-
ery of eight hundred tonnes of tin from the Council and having not yet
paid for it when the crash occurred; claiming set-off against its own
debts due from the Council, Lazmet hung onto the tin as a bargaining
counter. 66
Realizing that the chinks in its armor had been found, the Council
gave in to these three parties in April and concluded out-of-court settle-
ments with them. 6 The other banks, eyeing with envy the spoils going
to the swiftest, attempted to reach similar accommodations. To their
disappointment, the Council had no free assets left to offer." 8 The
Council only retained its administrative fund; because the Council had
reduced its staff, most of that fund was earmarked for legal
expenses. 69
In June, 1986 two other brokers won arbitration awards against the
immunity in the United Kingdom and could not have extra-territorial effect in the
United States. Id. In any case, the Court treated the Council's agreement to arbitration
in the contract as constituting a waiver of any sovereign immunity it might have en-
joyed. Id.
164. Standard Chartered Bank v. Int'l Tin Council, [1986] 3 All E.R. 257 (Q.B.).
165. Wagstyl, Creditors Closing in on International Tin Council, Fin. Times, Apr.
3, 1986, at 40.
166. Wagstyl & Hughes, Tin Broker Settles Out of Court with ITC, Fin. Times.
May 1, 1986, at 40.
167. See id. (noting that Standard Chartered received 874 tonnes of metal and
£1.2 million). Maclaine Watson accepted 910 tonnes in partial settlement and Lazmet
settled for 500 tonnes of the tin it had retained. Id.
168. Gowers, Banks Seek a Final Tin Settlement, Fin. Times, May 23, 1986, at
40.
169. Stainer, Fate of "Discredited" Tin Pact is Sealed. The Guardian (London),
June 9, 1986, at 23.
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I.T.C.. 70 Hungry for satisfaction of these awards, the traders followed
their fellow creditors in search of other sources of recovery. Their path
led straight to the only store of plenty on the landscape: the member
governments' treasuries. The creditors believed that they could politi-
cally shame or legally compel the member governments to pay for the
remaining debts of the Council. Eleven of the traders formed an entity
to co-ordinate their efforts, called "Tinco Realisations," which retained
the services of a hardened accountant and two public relations firms. 171
In August, Tinco launched an international offensive accusing the
member governments of gross irresponsibility and unlawful conduct.1 72
The campaign failed as the governments, including that of the United
Kingdom, continued to refuse to accept any legal liability for the Coun-
cil's debts.173
The creditors lost little time in taking legal action against the mem-
ber states. They took many different tracks. The creditors directly sued
the governments for the debts, launching three actions in the High
Court of England against all the members including the E.C. Another
action named only the United Kingdom Department of Trade and In-
dustry. 74 Actions occurred in other countries. Algemene Bank Neder-
land began preliminary investigative process in the Dutch courts
against the Netherlands government. 75 The broker Rudolf Wolff and
Co. had a Canadian parent company and commenced an action against
the Canadian government in the Supreme Court of Ontario.1 70 The
creditors also employed the remedies provided by insolvency law.
"Tinco" sought to wind up the Council and have the English High
Court appoint a liquidator, who would stand in the Council's shoes and
claim contributions from the members. 77 Maclaine Watson made ap-
170. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. won a settlement for £16.2 million. Trader
Wins Arbitration Award Against ITC, Fin. Times, June 6, 1986, at 40. Amalgamated
Metal Trading also won a settlement for £5.3 million. Another Trader Wins Claim
Against ITC, Fin. Times, June 13, 1986, at 40.
171. Wagstyl, Brokers Step Up Pressure for Tin Crisis Settlements, Fin. Times,
July 3, 1986, at 40; Griffiths, Accountant Heads Tin Traders' Bid to Recover Funds,
Fin. Times, June 16, 1986, at 6.
172. Gowers, Brokers Say Tin Council Members Acted Unlawfully, Fin. Times,
Aug. 26, 1986, at 8.
173. Simpson & Milner, Tin Brokers Stake a Million on Chance of Winning £400
Million, The Guardian (London), Sept. 2, 1986, at 26.
174. Hughes, Banks Sue Tin Council Members, Fin. Times, Dec. 30, 1986, at 36;
LME Trader Sues ITC Members, Fin. Times, July 16, 1986, at 3.
175. Raun, Dutch Bank Studies Tin Collapse Claim, Fin. Times, Feb. 20, 1987, at
32.
176. Owen, Noranda Files Suit Tin Suit Against Canada, Fin. Times, Oct. 21,
1987, at 38.
177. Gowers, Metal Brokers Seek to Wind Up World Tin Council, Fin. Times,
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plications to the English High Court to appoint a receiver for the
Council for similar reasons178 and then for an order requiring the
Council to disclose all of its assets, including debts owing to the Coun-
cil from its members.
The winding up case reached the courts, first, in December 1986.
The Council moved to strike the petition for winding up on two
grounds: on its now familiar defense of immunity from suit; and on the
basis that it was a special international entity, not an English company,
and therefore not subject to the particular winding up regime of the
Companies Act.1 9 Mr. Justice Millett agreed with the latter argument
and concluded that the High Court had no jurisdiction to wind up the
Council.180
The High Court heard the receivership application next, in April
1987. The creditors' motion asked the Court to appoint a receiver for
the Council by way of equitable execution to take over those powers or
assets of the Council which enabled it to demand contributions from its
members. 81 The Council moved to strike out the creditors' motion on
various grounds, including its immunity from suit and the existence of
non-justiciable issues: the Court would have to decide on the Council's
alleged rights by construction of an unincorporated treaty made be-
tween sovereign states.1 2 The Court held that this was technically an
appropriate case for appointment of a receiver by equitable execution
but that the Council must demonstrate the right to claim from its
members under the I.T.A.. Considering this a non-justiciable matter in
English courts, the judge refused to order the appointment of a receiver
for the Council.' 83
The examination application, heard in late June 1986, concerned a
creditor's right to compel the silent Council to disclose the extent and
nature of its assets, especially debts owing to it.18 4 Mr. Justice Millett
held that the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to order a defendant
to provide information on its assets to a judgment creditor if that would
prevent the judgment debtor from concealing his assets from lawful ex-
Sept. 1, 1986, at 1.
178. Hughes, More Suits Against Tin Council Announced, Fin. Times, Dec. 6,
1986, at 5.
179. Re International Tin Council, [1987] 1 All E.R. 890 (Ch.D.).
180. Id.
181. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Int'l Tin Council, [1987] 3 All E.R. 787, 789
(Ch.D.).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 787.
184. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Int'l Tin Council (No.2), [1987] 3 All E.R. 886
(Ch.D.).
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ecution. 18 5 The Court ordered a Council officer to disclose the extent of
its assets in the United Kingdom because Maclaine Watson possessed
such a valid judgment, its arbitration award.186
The four direct actions against the member governments came
before the Court in May 1987. The governments moved to strike for
having no reasonable cause. 87 Mr. Justice Staughton heard the motion
for all three actions, but found no basis on which its members could be
directly liable for the Council's debts: the Council was a separate legal
entity which had contracted on its own behalf. 88 The statements of
claim showed no reasonable cause of action so were struck out.189 Mr.
Justice Millett heard the case involving only the Department of Trade
and Industry and reached the same conclusion. 90 The action against
the Canadian government in the Supreme Court of Ontario, heard a
few months later, also was struck out, but for a different reason: it had
been commenced in the wrong court.19' Appeals soon were filed in all
of the above cases save the Canadian one.1 92
As the smoke cleared temporarily from the legal battlefield, both
sides took stock of the growing economic cost of the crisis. After the
rejection of Newco and the "ring-out" in March 1986, the price of tin
continued to fall, sliding below £4,000 a tonne.19 3 This price was less
than the average cost of production for all countries but Brazil, and
mines continued to close.' In 1986, Malaysia shut thirty per cent of
its mines, eliminating five thousand jobs.'95 Its export earnings from tin
slumped to forty per cent of those of the previous year and became a
prime cause of the diminution in its overall export earnings by seven
per cent over the same period. 96 Thailand closed forty per cent of its
mines and lost 8,500 jobs; its export earnings from tin were virtually
185. Id. at 886-87.
186. Id.
187. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade and Industry, [1987]
BCLC 667, 669-70 (Q.B.).
188. Id. at 692.
189. Id. at 716.
190. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dep't of Trade and Industry, [1987] BCLC 707,
713 (Ch.D.).
191. Rudolph Wolff & Co. v. The Queen in Right of Canada, C.O. 23081-87 (un-
reported decision of Henry J., Supreme Court of Ontario, Dec. 18, 1987).
192. See Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dep't Trade and Industry, [1988] 3 All E.R.
257 (C.A.) (hearing and deciding the three appeals).
193. Wagstyl, Tin Price Below £4,000, Fin. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, at 40.
194. See Wagstyl, Paying the Price of the Market's Collapse, Fin. Times, Mar. 12,
1986, at 16 (discussing the implications of the tin market collapse).
195. Id. at 16-17.
196. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 26-29; IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
STATISTICS (1989) [hereinafter IMF STATISTICS].
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halved.' 97 Bolivia's production fell by over a third between 1985 and
1986, cutting export revenues from tin by almost half.1 8 This reduction
had an enormous effect on Bolivia's overall export earnings because
shipments of tin have traditionally accounted for one-quarter of them;
Bolivia's overall earnings tumbled by ten per cent."' In total, world
production of tin fell by eight per cent between 1985 and 1986, with
only Brazil and Indonesia managing to maintain their levels of out-
put.200 In those mines which remained open, savage cuts were made in
costs to ensure their survival.20'
The severity of the crisis stimulated various official efforts to amelio-
rate the hardship. These occurred on both national and international
planes. The governments of at least three countries offered subsidies or
tax concessions to their mines.202 After the Council made its final regu-
latory act by terminating export controls in late March 1986,203 inter-
national leadership on matters of tin passed to UNCTAD and the
A.T.P.C. The A.T.P.C. requested UNCTAD to prepare terms of refer-
ence for a new international tin study group which would assume the
Council's responsibilities to disseminate information on the world's tin
industry. 04 With the loss of this and both buffer stock and export con-
trol operations, the Agreement now had little reason for existence;
nonetheless, the members formally extended the Agreement for two
years beyond its original expiration date of June 30, 1987.203
The responsibility for production management fell to the A.T.P.C.
itself. The A.T.P.C. began to intervene to help the market recover by
removing the enormous "overhang" of tin stocks, whether held by pro-
ducers themselves or creditors of the Council that had realized their
197. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 26-29; IMF STATISTICS, supra note 196.
198. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 26-29; IMF STATISTICS, supra note 196.
199. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 26-29; IMF STATISTICS, supra note 196.
200. I.T.C. STATISTics, supra note 1, at 26-29; IMF STATISTICS, supra note 196.
201. Rising Tin Means Rising Mine Costs-CRU, METAL BULL., May 18, 1989,
at 11.
202. The British government acted on a strong recommendation by the House of
Commons Select Committee and gave the Cornwall mines assistance worth £25 mil-
lion. 1 HOUSE OF COMMizONS, TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, THE TIN CRISIS, SEC-
OND REPORT 1985-86, at xxiii (1986) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT 1]; see A Bad
Decision in Cornwall, Fin. Times, Aug. 11, 1986, at 12. Malaysia also provided a sub-
sidy. Sulong, Malaysia Announces $26m Aid Package for Tin Industry, Fin. Times,
July 23, 1986, at 32. Thailand substantially reduced its taxes on tin mining firms.
Thailand Extends Tax Cuts, TIN INT'L, Aug. 1988, at 6.
203. Wagstyl, ITC May Scrap Tin Controls Soon. Fin. Times, Mar. 20, 1986, at
40.
204. Tin Crisis Bodes llfor Rubber Pact, Fin. Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at 40.
205. LME Lead Stocks to 7-Year'Low, Fin. Times, Apr. 14. 1987, at 38.
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security.2 °6 The A.T.P.C. warned the creditors of much lower prices if
they precipitously released much of their stocks into the market. 20 7 In
March 1987, the members of the A.T.P.C. overcame great internal ten-
sion, especially between Indonesia and Thailand, and resurrected the
quota system which the Council had operated for over thirty years.208
These export quotas, contemplating an eight per cent reduction in ex-
ports, were to remain in place for one year.0 9 While remaining outside
of the cartel-dubbed "Tinpec" by wary consumers-Brazil and China
co-operated with it.2 10 The institution of this scheme arrested the de-
cline in the tin price.
The full force of the crisis also hit the L.M.E. after the "ring-out."
The Exchange and its members just managed to contain the damage. 11
MMC Metals Ltd. was the only one of twenty-eight brokers to go
bankrupt, but six others were so badly wounded that they had to with-
draw from the Ring. Others had to be re-organized or buttressed by
212 thparent companies. All the rest suffered sustainable losses or sorely
impaired profits. This spate of near-failures put pressure on the L.M.E.
to change from a "clubby" association of brokers trading with one an-
other as principals into a modern exchange with a "clearing-house"
system. A "clearing-house" reduces the exposure of each member to
the potential default of another by requiring immediate registration of
all trades and -payment of margins and by offering the Exchange's
guarantee of payment on every contract. In May 1987, the L.M.E. in-
stituted such a system and incorporated itself.21 3
206. See ITC's Biggest Creditors Hold on to Tin Stocks, Fin. Times, Jan. 6, 1987,
at 22 [hereinafter ITC's Biggest] (detailing the creditors' actions in response to the
market collapse); Brown, Indonesia Urges Tin Producers to Intervene in Markets, Fin.
Times, Oct. 28, 1986, at 35 [hereinafter Brown, Indonesia Urges] (noting the concerns
of the tin producers over the dive in the market).
207. ITC's Biggest, supra note 206 at 22; Brown, Indonesia Urges, supra note 206,
at 35.
208. ITC's Biggest, supra note 206 at 22; Brown, Indonesia Urges, supra note 206,
at 35.
209. See Brown, Tin Export Curbs Come Into Effect, Fin. Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at
36 (defining the purpose and extent of export restrictions).
210. Id.; Brown, Indonesia's Change of Heart on "Tinpec," Fin. Times, Mar. 4,
1987, at 32.
211. See Wagstyl, Paying the Price of the Market's Collapse, Fin. Times, Mar. 12,
1986, at 16 (detailing the implications of the tin market collapse); Wagstyl, Metal
Trader to Withdraw from LME Floor, Fin. Times, Mar. 14, 1986, at I (describing the
effects of the collapse on the metal traders); Wagstyl, Rayner Withdraws from the
LME, Fin. Times, Mar. 21, 1986, at 44; Mooney, More Pressure for LME Change,
Fin. Times, Mar. 22, 1986, at 6 (listing the L.M.E.'s troubles and the ongoing develop-
ments in the market's reconstruction).
212. Supra note 211 and accompanying text.
213. Hughes, Resurgence of the L.M.E., EUROMONEY, Feb. 1988, at 33 [hereinaf-
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Such a re-organization may have put the L.M.E. on a sounder foot-
ing, but this in itself was not going to draw back the business which
had fled in October 1985. Other countries considered responding to, if
not taking advantage of, the L.M.E.'s embarrassment by launching
new tin markets or enhancing existing ones.214 Brazil reached an under-
standing with the A.T.P.C. to find a new exchange for tin, possibly in
New York.2 15 Singapore reviewed the possibilities of starting a tin mar-
ket, prompting a defensive response by Kuala Lumpur, which wanted
to remain the leading market in the region.2"' Kuala Lumpur Market
opened itself to traders from Thailand and Indonesia in January 1987
and launched trading in tin futures in October 1987.17
The I.T.C. cases came up to the English Court of Appeal in early
1988. The various appeals were all considered together given their com-
mon theme, importance, and difficulty. In what was to become one of
the largest and most complex hearings in the court's history, a legion of
barristers representing the various parties made lengthy submissions
before a panel of three judges: Kerr, Nourse, and Gibson LJJ.21 8 The
case was novel for another reason: mindful of the international impor-
tance of the cases to the parties and as precedents, the judges at-
tempted to transcend the familiar confines of English law and decide
the matter in a manner consonant with international law. In the intro-
ductory words of Lord Justice Kerr:
The legal problems involved in these proceedings are unprecedented, not only
in our courts but evidently anywhere. It would be inappropriate to consider them
solely by reference to English law in isolation. They concern all international
organizations operating in similar circumstances and require analysis on the
plane of public international law and of the relationship between international
law and domestic law of this country." 9
A fair legal analysis of the decisions is beyond the scope of this study.
The results, however, can be summarized-not without doing them
ter Hughes, Resurgence]; R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 22-28; see L.M.E. Mem-
bers Support Reform Streamlining, Fin. Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at 40 (noting the sup-
port of member firms for a clearing-house system).
214. Tin Producers to Seek New Trading Exchange, Int'l Herald-Tribune, Sept. 5,
1986, at 13.
215. Id.
216. Kuala Lumpur Tin Market Talks Planned, Fin. Times, May 29, 1986, at 40;
see KLTM Fails to Attract Foreign Sellers, Fin. Times, Jan. 6, 1987, at 27 (listing the
possible reasons why the Kuala Lumpur Exchange had difficulty finding foreign
sellers).
217. Sulong, Malaysia Plans Tin Futures Trade, Fin. Times, Oct. i, 1987, at 38.
218. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dep't of Trade and Industry, [1988] 3 All E.R.
257 at 269. (C.A.).
219. Id.
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some violence-as follows.
In the direct actions, the court focused on the Council's juridical na-
ture and its relationship to its members. Three theories of members'
liability existed, each asking a different question: (1) does the Council
have no legal personality distinct from its members?; (2) if it does have
such independent legal personality, are the members concurrently liable
for its debts as in a partnership under domestic law?; and (3) if the
Council has independent legal personality and its members are not con-
currently liable, is the Council an agent for its undisclosed principals,
the members? 220 Because the states could not claim sovereign immu-
nity from the jurisdiction of the Court, 21 only one of these three ques-
tions needed an affirmative answer for the states to be liable.
Lord Justice Kerr determined the first question by stating that while
the Council was not a body corporate under English law, it was a "le-
gal entity on the plane of international law. 222 International organiza-
tions are creatures of international and not national law; any other con-
clusion would "domesticate or naturalize international legal entities by
subjecting them to the requirements of municipal laws which would be
inconsistent with their international character. 223 The provisions in the
I.T.A., the Headquarters Agreement, and the consequential orders
under English law giving effect to these treaties established the Council
as such an international legal entity distinct from its member states.2
In particular, the Council's right to contract and capacity to suffer ar-
bitration awards would make no sense unless it was a separate entity;
to borrow the apt words uttered by counsel at the appeals, "[d]ebeo,
ergo sum. 225
His Lordship found the second question more problematic as entities
of mixed liability do exist in many legal systems. Noting the dearth of
international law on this point, Lord Justice Kerr construed the I.T.A.
as if it were the constitution of a foreign corporation. He could not
"find anything in it to support the suggestion that the parties to this
220. Id. at 274-75.
221. Id. at 313-15, 358. The determination of the issue of sovereign immunity
turned on the interpretation of the State Immunity Act 1978 (United Kingdom). Id. at
313. This Act denies states immunity from the jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts
in those proceedings relating to "a commercial transaction entered into by the State"
or "an obligation of the State which by contract (whether a commercial transaction or
not) is to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom." Id. The Court of
Appeal found that if the member states were otherwise liable for the Council's debts,
the liability would arise in proceedings relating to one or both of these categories. Id.
222. Id. at 274.
223. Id. at 296.
224. Id. at 297-98.
225. Id. at 275-98.
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treaty intended that they should be liable for the contractual obliga-
tions of the I.T.C. if they should remain unperformed. On the contrary,
such indications as these point firmly in the opposite direction."22 The
Council members, therefore, are not concurrently liable for its debts. 7
The answer to the third question was only slightly less difficult.
Again lacking any precedent in international law on the point, Lord
Justice Kerr turned to the I.T.A. and could find nothing to suggest that
when contracting under its own name, "the Council was acting as
agent for the members as undisclosed principals under the con-
tracts."22 The relationship between the members and the Council was
compared to a "contract of association or membership similar to that
which arises on the formation of a company between the shareholders
inter se and the legal entity which they have created by their contract
of association. ' 229 Having failed to find a basis for the members' liabil-
ity on these three theories, Lord Justice Kerr dismissed the appeal.2 30
Lord Justice Ralph Gibson concurred, with separate but similar rea-
sons, forming a majority of the Court to decide the appeal. 231 Lord
Justice Nourse, however, did not concur with his two brother judges
and wrote a strong dissenting opinion in which he held that the mem-
ber states should be liable for the Council's debts.232
The three judges, having an easier time with the winding up and
receivership appeals, dismissed them unanimously by generally endors-
ing the reasons of Mr. Justice Millett.233 The creditors then won two
minor victories, one real and one moral. The Court's disclosure of as-
sets ruling was dismissed unanimously.2 3' The appeal judges concluded
their lengthy judgments by delivering a stinging rebuke of the conduct
of the Council, its members and officers:
The way in which the Council has again resisted the present proceedings,
designed to assist in the enforcement of a debt to which there is no answer
whatever, speaks for itself. In our view this conduct is unbecoming to an interna-
tional organization, to those who constitute it and to those who are responsible
226. Id. at 304.
227. Id. at 298-307.
228. Id. at 300.
229. Id. at 306.
230. Id. at 336-59.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 323-36. Lord Justice Nourse reasoned that while the I.T.A. does not
address concurrent liability, one must look to the principles of national and interna-
tional law for assistance. Id. International law, as evidenced by the writings of two
jurists, suggests that the attribution of separate legal personality to an international
organization does not extinguish the liability of its members. Id.
233. Id. at 359-76.
234. Id. at 376-84.
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for its actions. The ITC's present duty is to undo to the greatest possible extent
the damage to its creditors by ensuring that its assets are used to pay its debts,
without any further prevarication. And its members are, in our view, at least
morally obliged to put the ITC in funds to ensure that its creditors are ultimately
paid in full."'B
Foiled yet again, the creditors appealed to the House of Lords on the
strength of the dissent of Lord Justice Nourse; this appeal ultimately
failed.2"6 They also changed gears and launched a new action in the
High Court of England against the Council members based in tort, and
later against the E.C. in the European Court of Justice.287 In the En-
glish tort action, the creditors alleged that the states had fraudulently
and negligently misrepresented the Council's situation and had traded
fraudulently. Once again, the members tried to prevent the action by
moving to strike as disclosing no reasonable cause of action; once again
they succeeded.238 Mr. Justice Evans heard the application in February
1989 and focused on the commercial nature of the Council's undertak-
ing; while this disentitled the members to claim sovereign immunity, it
also precluded the creditors from establishing that the members had a
duty of care to the creditors, essential in establishing any case of negli-
gence.2"" The members could only be liable if it could be proved that
they acted fraudulently. Unfortunately for the creditors, English law
requires that an alleged fraudulent representation about the credit wor-
thiness of any person must have been made in writing by the defendant
for it to provide the basis for a claim. Because no member made such a
representation in writing, the claim failed.240
In their court actions, the creditors only seemed to be winning hearts
but not minds. In mid-1988, however, they finally received a little cash
and the prospect of more."" The order to disclose assets forced the
Council to reveal the details of its finances, which proved to be substan-
tial. The Council admitted that the members, primarily Nigeria and
Zaire, owed it £5.7 million. 4 2 It also had over a hundred thousand
pounds in its administrative account. The creditors quickly secured
235. Id. at 384.
236. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal for reasons virtually identical to
those expressed by Lord Justices Kerr and Ralph Gibson. Tin Council Creditors Suffer
Grave Inequalities, Fin. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at 20.
237. Hughes, European Court Ruling Sought on ITC, Fin. Times, Feb. 27, 1989,
at 34.
238. See Daries, ITC Creditors Can Sue Member States, Fin. Times, Feb. 28,
1989, at 7.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Hughes, Members Owe Tin Council £5.7m, Fin. Times, June 14, 1988, at 34.
242. Hughes, Tin Creditors to Obtain First Cash, Fin. Times, July 9, 1988, at 5.
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court orders freezing these assets and then compelling the transfer of
the funds in the account to the creditors. 4 3
This stripping of liquid assets from the Council in July 1988 forced it
to terminate its staff and operations. 24 ' The members of the Council
responded to this closure in two ways. First, they established a trust
fund administered by UNCTAD as an interim arrangement to carry on
the important basic statistical work of the Council;245 an international
tin study group, supported by thirty-six countries, was being primed to
take over this work permanently.246 Second, the members, led by Ca-
nada, also tried again to seek a negotiated settlement of the crisis from
May 1989.247 The renewed negotiations stalled when the gap between
what the states were offering and what the creditors were willing to
accept still proved to be enormous.2 48 The stalemate finally ended in
December 1989, when the United Kingdom and Japan offered to close
the gap by paying more than their proportionate share of the Council's
debts.24 9 All creditors which had sued the governments accepted this
compromise, which would satisfy only about forty per cent of their
claims and would not secure any admission of liability from the mem-
ber states.250
With such excruciating slowness in securing a settlement, the Coun-
cil could not be rescued before the Sixth I.T.A. expired on June 30,
1989. As the Council had not been the subject of further international
resolution, it assumed a phantom-like character; it was extant, but had
no responsibilities, funds or employees.2"1 The Council's passage to the
243. Id.; Hughes, Members Owe Tin Council £5.7m, Fin. Times, June 14, 1988, at
34.
244. Tin Council Forced to Shut Up Shop, Fin. Times, July 7, 1988, at 38.
245. Tin Council Members Consider Rescue Plan, Fin. Times, July 8, 1988, at 30;
TIN STATISrICS, supra note 2, at 1.
246. Hughes, Tin Litigation Enters Final Phase in House of Lords, Fin. Times,
June 13, 1989, at 36.
247. Hughes, Canada Proposes Tin Crisis Meeting, Fin. Times, July 13, 1988, at
34; Portuguese Mine to Instal $60 Mfil Tin Recovery Plant, Fin. Times, Dec. 13, 1988,
at 36.
248. The creditors claimed debts of £513 million, but were reported willing to set-
tle for £225, then £182.5 million, while the members initially offered only £150 mil-
lion. Prest, Tin Council to have Talks with Creditors, The Independent (London),
May 11, 1989, at 26; Hughes & Gooding, Time Runs Short for Tin Case Settlement,
Fin. Times, May 16, 1989, at 36; Gooding, Tin Settlement Talks Break Up, Fin.
Times, May 17, 1989, at 36; Tin Pact Expiry "Will Not Affect Settlement," Fin.
Times, May 31, 1989, at 40; Tin Settlement Doubts, MINING J., July 28, 1989, at 74.
249. The United Kingdom tendered £30 million and Japan £40 million. Tin Settle-
ment Doubts, supra note 248, at 74.
250. Gooding, Tin Creditors' £182.5m Accord, Fin. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at 22.
251. Save the chairman, who was to be available to chair meetings of the members
when required. Prest, Tin Council Close to Being Wound Up, The Independent
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institutional afterlife on July 1, 1989 was little marked, testimony to
the fact that after having been adjudged guilty of "conduct unbecom-
ing an international organization," nobody really mourned its passing.
Ironically, the Council's demise occurred as the health of many of its
alleged victims recovered. The tin market perked up considerably in
1988 and 1989. Consumption increased steadily from 1985.252 The
A.T.P.C. successfully controlled exports and thereby eliminated most of
the world's "overhang" of tin stocks by mid-1989.253 Indeed, the pro-
ducers managed to overcome their internal tension and extended the
export quotas, first until February 1989, and then until December
1990.254 The price of tin rose throughout 1988 and into 1989, so that
by April 1989 it had climbed to ninety-three per cent of the prevailing
price at the time of the crash.2 55 Sensitive as ever to price, production
of tin rose accordingly. Indeed, the world's production of tin in 1988
was eleven per cent higher than it had been in 1986. The tin producers
began to change the focus of their concern fearing that the quick price
recovery would encourage substantial additional production, and dis-
rupt the market and the export control scheme.2 56 This fear was well-
founded, as the price of tin slid during the second half of 1989 back to
the level prevailing during 1987.257
All major producers expanded their production of tin from the levels
of 1986 and 1987, with one significant exception: Bolivia. In 1988 its
production was sixty-one per cent and its export earnings from tin
forty-one per cent of those of 1985.258 Over twenty thousand miners
were laid off, some of whom turned to the only apparent remunerative
activity available, the drug trade. 59 Many blamed the collapse of the
(London), Sept. 6, 1988, at 22.
252. TIN STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 4.
253. Today's Tin Market-A Statistical Overview, METAL BULL., June 29, 1989,
at 9 [hereinafter Today's Tin Market].
254. Tin Producers Agree to Extend Export Quotas, Fin. Times, Oct. 27, 1988, at
44; Sulong, Producers Agree to Continue Quota Scheme, Fin. Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at
42; Export Controls Extended by Nine Big Tin Producers, Fin. Times, Oct. 18, 1989,
at 38.
255. Gooding, Shortage of Stocks May Threaten the Return of Tin, Fin. Times,
June 1, 1989, at 38.
256. Malaysia Worried at Pace of Tin Price Upsurge, Fin. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at
38.
257. Commodity Price Index, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1989, at 123.
258. TIN STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 6; IMF STATISTICS, supra note 196, at 131-
32.
259. See World Mining Update, TIN INT'L, July 1988, at 9.(stating that many tin
mines ceased operations); The Cocaine Economies, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1988, at
38.
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I.T.A. directly for Bolivia's plight.26 0
The L.M.E. also recuperated in 1988 and 1989. The action of Shear-
son Lehman against the L.M.E. for its conduct of the "ring-out" was
decided in March 1989 in favor of the Exchange. 6 ' Mr. Justice Web-
ster of the English High Court held that the L.M.E. rule fixing the
price of contracts was validly imposed under the constitution of the
Exchange.262 Encouraged by this exoneration, as well as the rising price
of tin, the L.M.E. decided to try to regain its lost prominence in the tin
market and re-launch its tin contract. The contract launched, however,
was not exactly the same as the one which had been suspended in 1985.
In belated recognition of the international practice to price tin transac-
tions in United States dollars or currencies tied to the dollar, the
L.M.E. priced its contract in dollars. The sound of the brokers trading
tin in the Ring on June 1, 1989 was the surest signal that, after three
and a half difficult years, the tin crisis was finally over.263
IV. CAUSES OF COLLAPSE
The I.T.A. collapsed for a variety of reasons. Each of these alone
would not have caused the demise, but their occurrence in concert
proved fatal. These causes are of two types: those which were funda-
mental to the Agreement and had been apparent for some time, and
those which were unexpected precipitants. These causes are listed be-
low in roughly descending order of importance.
A. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES
1. Uncertain Objective of the Agreement
The most important cause of the Agreement's collapse was the ten-
sion in its objectives. This tension, latent since 1965, crippled the I.T.A.
in the early 1980s. The members of the Agreement could not agree
whether, and to what extent, the I.T.A. was a cartel solely to benefit
the producers or a stabilizing influence to benefit producer and con-
sumer equally.
The I.T.A. began in 1956 under the banner of the Havana Charter
to provide stability in the tin market for the benefit of both producer
260. The Cocaine Economies, supra note 259, at 38. A former finance minister of
the country was quoted as confirming this unhappy shift, that "Bolivia has gone from
the economy of tin to the economy of coca." Id.
261. Hughes, LME Defeats Tin Damages Claim, Fin. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at 38.
262. Id.
263. Hughes, Resurgence, supra note 213, at 33; Gooding, Brisk Re-start for Tin
Trading on LME, Fin. Times, June 2, 1989, at 34.
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and consumer. In the late 1970s, with UNCTAD's sponsorship and the
campaign for a N.I.E.O., the Agreement's emphasis changed from sta-
bility of the tin market to support of the tin price for the benefit of
producing countries in the developing world. This shift dissolved the
cement which had kept the Agreement together for twenty-five years,
the premise of equal partnership between producer and consumer coun-
tries for direct mutual benefit. The Agreement then became mostly a
one-sided affair that relied substantially on the largess of the consum-
ing countries to keep it running. The target price bands moved up regu-
larly, but never down. Even in 1982, with the bottom falling out of all
metals markets during the severest recession in fifty years, the Council
demonstrated its producers' bias and raised its target price band. In so
doing, the I.T.A. "degenerated into an arrangement for the defense of
a non-competitive price floor."26
Developed countries responded to these continual increases in the
target band by questioning the appropriateness of the Agreement's use
as a vehicle for transferring resources to producing countries. Some de-
veloped countries, notably the United States, condemned the drift to-
wards a cartel and retired from the Agreement before it actually be-
came a cartel. Many of those developed countries which remained,
such as the United Kingdom, were not really committed, but were
afraid of diplomatic repercussions if they withdrew. Their ambivalence
caused them to commit two egregious errors: first, to acquiesce in the
implementation of the ill-advised policies of the Council between 1982
and 1985; and second, to fail to rescue the Council when these policies
rendered it insolvent. The Select Committee on Trade and Industry
concluded that "it was wrong to allow doubtful considerations of inter-
national relations to outweigh common sense when the decision was
taken [for the United Kingdom] to join the Sixth ITA. ' '12 6 In short, in
its sixth incarnation the I.T.A. met the interests of few, if any, states
and was disowned when it ran into trouble.
2. Flawed Operation of Cartel
Once the Council started to assume the role of administering a cartel
in the early 1980s, it failed to take the necessary strategic steps to en-
sure the cartel's success. Osborne has identified five problems that car-
tels face, one external and four internal. The external problem, which is
the most important to overcome, is "to predict (and if possible, discour-
264. Anderson & Gilbert, Commodity Agreements and Commodity Markets: Les-
sons from Tin, 98 EcON. J. 1, 11 (1988).
265. FIRST REPORT, supra note 71, at vii.
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age) production by non-members.11266 The internal problems are: "first,
to locate the contract surface; second, to choose a point on that surface
(the sharing problem); third, to detect; and fourth, to deter cheat-
ing. 267 If these problems cannot be overcome, the cartel is doomed to
failure.
The Council probably failed on all of these five counts, but certainly
on the first and last. It proved incapable of discouraging production by
non-members. During the period between 1980 and 1984, the share of
the world's production under the Council's control shrunk from sev-
enty-four per cent to fifty-two per cent. In 1984, the Council did not
control the world's fourth, fifth, and sixth largest producing countries.
The fifth and sixth, China and Brazil, could not be persuaded to join
the Agreement; the fourth, Bolivia, had just left it. One of these non-
members, Brazil, took advantage of the Council members' restraint and
appropriated ever-larger shares of the market. As the Select Commit-
tee expressed in its report: "[a]s only about half of the world produc-
tion of tin ore is under the control of the ITC, and this proportion has
diminished considerably since 1980, the attempts by the ITC to match
international supply to demand by means of export controls are bound
to fail. 26
In addition, the Council failed to prevent its members from cheating.
The Council was aware that much production of its members, particu-
larly in South-East Asia, was being smuggled out of the countries in
defiance of export restrictions. The Council did not suppress this smug-
gling and lost most of whatever control it still had over the market.
The Council tried to compensate for a failed strategy with more ag-
gressive tactics. The buffer stock, which the I.T.A. established as a sup-
plementary means of stabilizing the market, was given the primary
mission of supporting the price on a long-term basis.26 9 As the Select
Committee report concluded: "[iln these circumstances the Buffer
Stock system was bound in the end to require unlimited financial
resources."
270
3. Decision-making Structure
The Council's structure was a fundamental cause of the Agreement's
266. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 Am. ECON. REV. 835-44 (1976).
267. Id.
268. SECOND REPORT I, supra note 202, at ix-xi.
269. Gilbert, International Commodity Agreements: Design and Performance, 15
WORLD DEv. 591, 611 (1987).
270. SECOND REPORT I, supra note 202, at xi.
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collapse because it precluded the timely making of difficult decisions.
The requirement that most decisions obtain a two-thirds majority of
votes in each bloc not only delayed the Council's response to rapidly
changing circumstances, but also gave each substantial member a vir-
tual veto on changes. When crisis loomed, near unanimity was impossi-
ble to attain, and the Council's suicidal course was locked in. Without
any decision of the Council to suspend trading or to lower the floor in
the first half of 1985, the Buffer Stock Manager felt obliged to con-
tinue his defense of the floor to the very last credit."7 '
This requirement for near-unanimity also paralysed the Council's abil-
ity to consider and implement the reasonable rescue plans which were
tendered to it.
B. PRECIPITANTS
1. Exchange Rate Fluctuations
An important factor to consider when setting price references for
commodity agreements is the possible changes in the value of the cur-
rency in which the references are made.272 The members did not ade-
quately appreciate this in the Fifth and Sixth Agreements. They set the
Council to operate between two markets with different currencies, the
Malaysian ringgit and the pound sterling. When the United States dol-
lar appreciated against the pound sterling between 1981 and 1985, it
made the Council's operations on the L.M.E. much more expensive and
caused its funds to be depleted quickly. When the dollar subsequently
depreciated, it diminished the value of the banks' security, precipitating
their intervention. Some have suggested that had the currency fluctua-
tions been different, the Council might have survived. 273 This is indeed
possible. The important point, however, is that the Council was made
to assume great foreign exchange risk and suffered for it. As Gibson-
Jarvie has put it: "[t]o operate the price-restraint or price-support pro-
271. Id. at xii. To quote the Select Committee report:
It appears to us that the ITC was totally out of control, and that a council of
officials from 22 countries which are not very likely to agree on anything consist-
ently is not a suitable body for what may need to be day-to-day control of a
rapidly changing market. There were so many decisions (e.g. on price levels)
requiring to be made by the full Council or by the Buffer Finance Committee,
which did not meet often enough to have any influence, that the only decision left
to the BSM appears to have been how much to gamble in forward dealings
before he admitted defeat. The ITC should have stopped him: but it was clearly
in the interests of some of the members not to do so.
Id.
272. Gilbert, supra note 269, at 599.
273. Anderson & Gilbert, supra note 264, at 13.
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gramme in two currencies both happily floating seems to be courting
unnecessary difficulties. 274
2. Malaysian Secret Purchasing
The Malaysian government secretly conducted an enormous purchas-
ing program and created an important precipitant of the crisis. By driv-
ing up prices during a recession, the program gave two wrong signals: it
encouraged producers around the world to continue unsustainable
volumes of output and caused the Council to raise its price band to a
level which it could not defend.275
3. Futures Trading
Some have argued that the Council's futures trading was a primary
cause of the crisis.276 This is an overstatement. Futures trading helped
precipitate the Council's insolvency by making a bad situation much
worse, but did not cause it.
"[F]utures trading.., enhanced the ITC's ability to defend the sta-
bilization floor."'2 77 The Council could tie up more tin at less cost than
purchases for delivery, a technique that could have been beneficial had
it been employed prudently. The Council's program of futures trading
got out of hand, however, and became very highly leveraged. It thus
became a virtual pyramid scheme that, without further resources from
member states, was likely to collapse eventually. When the scheme did
collapse, it not only presented the Council with additional liabilities,
but diminished the value of the Council's assets because:
tin warrants entered as assets in the ITC balance sheet, by raising the tin price
futures purchases also improved the appearance of the ITC's financial position
permitting additional futures purchases .... [W]hen the collapse eventually
came, the sixth ITA was transformed from apparent financial health to substan-
tial negative net worth in a very short time.17R
As Gilbert has suggested, the Council's problem was not its power to
trade futures, but the methods of financing and monitoring this
trading. 9
274. R. GInSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 29.
275. Aml6t, supra note 88, at 11; Todav's Tin Market, supra note 253, at 9.
276. See Gilbert, supra note 269, at 595.
277. Anderson & Gilbert, supra note 264, at 1I.
278. Id. at 11-12.
279. Gilbert, supra note 269, at 595.
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4. Inactivity by Regulators
The Bank of England, the Department of Trade and Industry of the
United Kingdom, and the L.M.E. were aware at least a year before the
crash occurred that the Council was in serious trouble. Although one
can sympathize with their respective perceived jurisdictional incapaci-
ties, given that the Council's headquarters and its chief market were in
London and that British creditors and miners were significantly ex-
posed, their inactivity was unfortunate. They were the only institutions
in the world positioned to head off a collapse. The Select Committee
criticized the conduct of both the Bank and the Department:
The Bank of England should have warned the banks that ITC Member Gov-
ernments might not provide any finance additional to their original contributions.
This would have affected the lending policies of the banks ...
The Government should not have been so secretive about its own intentions.
Enormous investment, the reputation of a major city institution and of the Bank
of England, and the jobs of thousands of Cornish people were at stake.280
Gibson-Jarvie has criticized the L.M.E. in similar terms: "corrective
action might have been anticipated from the Exchange authorities. Yet
it now seems clear that they too were hypnotised by the status of the
ITC in the belief that it could never go seriously wrong." '281 In fairness,
the conduct of the Bank, the Department, and the L.M.E. in trying to
find a solution to the crisis after it broke must mitigate whatever criti-
cism they incur.
5. Sales from United States Strategic Stockpile
The disruptive sale of tin from the United States strategic stockpile
has been cited as an important cause of the collapse. 2 2 This is an exag-
geration. The G.S.A. only sold 365 tonnes of tin in 1984 and 375 ton-
nes in 1985283 and therefore could not be directly responsible for pre-
cipitating the I.T.C.'s financial crisis in 1985. Rather, the United
States disposal program, started in 1981, was an indirect cause of the
collapse insofar as it contributed to the generally depressed conditions
of the tin market in the early 1980s and caused the Council to expend
much of its resources at that time. Sales from the G.S.A. between 1981
and 1983 were extensive, totalling thirteen thousand tonnes. These
sales coincided with, if they had not partially motivated, large
280. FIRST REPORT, supra note 71, at vii.
281. R. GIBSON-JARVIE, THE TIN CRISIS 35 (Cambridge 1986).
282. B.S. CHIMNI, supra note 158, at 201.
283. I.T.C. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 46.
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purchases by the buffer stock. 8 The I.T.A. authorized further sales of
tin of up to twenty thousand tonnes in October 1984.80 Despite the
fact that these sales were not made in 1984 nor 1985, the authorization
doubtless had a further dampening effect on the price.
6. The Creditors' Risk Assessment
The creditors themselves must bear much of the responsibility for the
damage they suffered. The Council was a large player in a volatile
market and, therefore, was obviously a significant credit risk. The cred-
itors ignored the growing extent of this risk to retain the Council's lu-
crative business.
The banks' claim that, in their accounts with I.T.C., they always
believed they were dealing only and directly with governments of un-
questionable solvency is disingenuous for three reasons. First, interna-
tional loans to the most credit-worthy sovereign powers are not usually
secured by assignment of property, let alone an assignment of property
whose value equals one hundred and twenty-five per cent of the out-
standing debt.288 The banks' demands that the Council tender huge
amounts of tin as security for the loans thus indicates their belief that
they were dealing with a separate entity. Second, the banks' first reac-
tion in October 1985, was to demand guarantees of the Council's in-
debtedness from member governments; had they truly believed that the
members were standing squarely behind the Council, this would not
have been their first response. Third, another commodity agreement
with a similarly wide membership, but which was less successful, had
difficulty securing commercial credit.2 87 In any case, demonstrating
poor credit instincts, many of the banks apparently did not conduct a
sufficiently thorough investigation of the Council, its constitution, and
its affairs before approving their loans. At least five banks did not in-
clude an arbitration clause in their loan documents;288 this clause was a
potential source of important rights for the banks which the Council
would have had to accept by the terms of the Headquarteis Agree-
284. Gilbert, supra note 269, at 611.
285. TIN STATIsTIcS, supra note 2, at 19.
286. Compare Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley, supra note 131, at 21 (describ-
ing the term of the Council's loans) with G.A. PENN, A.M. SHEA, & A. ARoRA, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 91-117, 172-95 (London 1987) (set-
ting out the standard terms and remedies in international sovereign loans).
287. This occurred with the Cocoa Agreement. See UNCTAD, Commodity Agree-
ments, supra note 88, at 35, para. (d) (discussing the Cocoa Agreement).
288. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade and Industry, [1987]
BCLC 667, 674 (Q.B.).
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ment. As Mr. Justice Bingham pointed out with regard to Standard
Chartered Bank's "facility letter," this omission was probably an
oversight.
The brokers were in a similar position. Most of the brokers main-
tained (temporarily) profitable accounts with the Council with low
margins even after the Bank of England warned them of potential
problems. Gibson-Jarvie has criticized the activity of the brokers as fol-
lows: "the brokers who were co-operating with the [Buffer Stock Man-
ager] in the special deals were playing a highly dangerous game. Ex-
perts in the market, they should perhaps have known better."2 89
7. Structure of the L.M.E.
Some critics have stated that the structure of the L.M.E. both pre-
cipitated and exacerbated the crisis because it was a market of princi-
pals and not a clearing-house. The market, comprised of principals who
did not register their trades with the Exchange, masked the Council's
true exposure.290 The principals' market also precluded prudence in set-
ting and uniformity in applying a significant financial constraint on the
Council.291 Further, once the Council caused one member of the
L.M.E. to default, nothing stopped a chain-reaction of defaults except
the financial strength of the individual members, some of which had
had no contact with the Council.292
These concerns were valid, but another structure could probably not
have averted or substantially softened the crisis. Greater transparency
in the Council's trading might have brought matters to a head earlier
and reduced the amount of its liabilities. Given the creditors' continu-
ing illusions of the Council's creditworthiness, even after being in-
formed of the growing risks, however, this knowledge might not have
encouraged sufficient and timely corrective action. Further, although
the structure of the L.M.E. was obviously insufficient to contain the
crisis, no evidence exists that a clearing-house would have been much
better. "A clearing-house simply spreads the misery amongst its mem-
bers";2193 thus, a clearing-house only might have helped those few bro-
kers that had no contracts with the Council, but were faced with a
knocked-on default of greater amount than their proportional share of
289. R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 9.
290. Anderson and Gilbert, supra note 264, at 12.
291. Gilbert, supra note 269, at 595.
292. See R. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 9, at 36 (addressing the effects of default
on the clearing-house system).
293. Id. at 37.
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a default carried by a clearing-house.
V. EFFECTS OF COLLAPSE
The Agreement's collapse, which the Council's insolvency triggered,
brought enormous consequences. Some were direct effects felt by the
Council's creditors and participants in the tin market. Others were
more remote effects in the nature of spill-over to other markets or the
establishment of precedent. The effects are listed below in order of de-
scending degree of proximity to the Agreement's collapse.
A. DIRECT EFFECTS
1. Creditors' Loss
The most proximate effect of the I.T.A.'s collapse was the enormous
loss suffered by the Council's creditors, which they claimed to be al-
most £300 million after the settlement is taken into account. This loss
was unevenly distributed among sixteen banks and thirteen brokers,
which themselves are of varying financial strengths. All of the banks
are substantial institutions which can absorb the loan losses. The bro-
kers, however, are much smaller.9 4 One broker could not shoulder the
loss and many of the remainder had grave difficulty in so doing.
2. Business and Structure of the L.M.E.
The collapse of the Agreement caused non-creditor brokers on the
L.M.E. to suffer three knock-on effects of the Council's default. First,
creditors of the Council defaulted on contracts to fellow brokers. Sec-
ond, the lower prices forced by the "ring-out" caused further losses to
some (and, it must be noted, gains to others). Third, all brokers suf-
fered from the decline in trading of other metals on the L.M.E. which
only fully recovered in 1989.
The L.M.E.'s fear of losing its tin market to other exchanges because
of its three and a half year trading suspension has been only partially
realized. The first months of renewed tin trading on the L.M.E. have
been thin but adequate;" 5 the L.M.E. will likely retain its position as
the most important international tin futures market. Its dominance,
however, will not reach pre-1985 levels. The Kuala Lumpur Commod-
294. See Memorandum of the Ring Dealers, supra note 7, at 108 (providing a
table listing the net worth of the Ring members).
295. See Tin Attracts Mediocre Interest, METAL BULL, Aug. 7, 1989, at 10 (ex-
plaining the lull in trading business on the L.M.E.).
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ity Exchange has since 1987 picked up significant, if thinner, futures
business." 6 Both exchanges have expressed hope that their markets will
be complementary. 9 Another may soon join them, as Brazil is consid-
ering launching a tin futures contract on the So Paulo Exchange.2 98
The collapse caused the structure of the L.M.E. to be strengthened.
It instituted a "clearing-house" system and incorporated itself. The ex-
change's victory in the courts over its imposition of the "ring-out" will
doubtless strengthen its authority to impose controversial rules on its
members.
3. Depression of the Tin Market
The extent to which the Agreement's collapse caused the painful de-
pression of the tin market between 1985 and 1988 is the most difficult
question to answer. This uncertainty stems from a premise that if the
Council had little or moderate effect on the tin market over its thirty-
year history, its removal from operation could not be wholly responsible
for the state of the tin market thereafter. Indeed, critics cannot blame
the Agreement for the impact of trend and cyclical movements which
were not only beyond its control, but which ultimately defeated it.
The tin market has been beset by great long-term problems, the most
important of which is stagnant consumption. The severity of the 1982
recession precipitated a tremendous cyclical decline in consumption and
prices of all metals, and tin is no exception. The tin market would have
suffered declining prices and reduced production had the Council not
existed or not collapsed (but had no benefit of additional resources).
One can even allege that even by absorbing enormous quantities of ex-
cess tin from the market between 1982 and 1984, the Council delayed
the crash for a few years and paid higher prices to producers than they
would have received in an unregulated market. One commentator in
early 1985 estimated the sum that the Council caused to be transferred
to producers in 1984 to be five hundred million pounds.299
Little doubt exists, however, that the Council's management of the
296. See Trading-What of the Future?, TIN INT'L, Jan. 1989, at 9 (covering the
prosperity of the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange).
297. See Trading Operations on the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange, METAL
BULL., July 6, 1989, at 13 (suggesting that the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange
and the L.M.E. will complement each other); LME to Start Tin Trading June
]-Price Tops $10,000 at Last, METAL BULL., Apr. 17, 1989, at 9 (assuring that the
L.M.E. desires not to compete with the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange).
298. Brazil Getting into Tin Futures?, TIN INT'L, Jan. 1989, at 4.
299. Stainer, Tin Prices Brought Under Control, The Guardian, Apr. 29, 1985, at
[VOL. 5:835
INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT
early 1980s worked both ways and greatly exacerbated the punishment
which the tin market ultimately received. The great uncertainty that
immediately followed the collapse of the Council caused purchases of
tin virtually to evaporate. This, in turn, caused the price of the small
amounts of tin traded on the secondary markets to plummet; producers
had to scale down production accordingly. The price and production
were further and more profoundly depressed by the assessment of the
likely effect of the disposition of the Council's stocks. Because the tin
market is a relatively thin one, the prospect of creditors dumping enor-
mous volumes onto the market was enough to exert a strong influence.
In time, however, the tin market showed its traditional resilience; by
1989 it had largely shrugged off the crisis and was poised for immedi-
ate, if uneven, expansion. 300 The exception, of course, is Bolivia, whose
industry is still depressed. While one can have sympathy for Bolivia's
unique plight, Bolivia has little moral or economic right to blame the
Agreement's collapse; Bolivia refused to join the Sixth Agreement and
thus helped undermine it. More importantly, Bolivia's problems in tin
production are domestic and deep-seated: its expensive production costs
and mismanagement caused it to lose market share to more competitive
countries. Its production has been falling steadily since 1977. One of
the worst years of production and general economic decline was 1984,
before the insolvency of the Council.30 1 After a painful restructuring of
the industry, the Bolivian government finally hoped to improve output
from 1989.30
4. Rise of Producers' Cartel
The crisis transformed the A.T.P.C. from a producers' lobby group
into an active cartel. In restricting their common output from 1987, the
members have demonstrated their cohesion and effectiveness. Whether
they can maintain this cohesion under more normal market conditions
remains to be seen. Certainly they will face the old problem of securing
the continued co-operation of non-members, particularly Brazil. 3 '
300. The world's tin industry was forced to become "leaner and meaner." Rising
Tin Means Rising Mine Costs-CRU, METAL BULL., May 18, 1989, at 11. Cost-cut-
ting in mines and improvements in productivity allowed the profitable operation of a
great majority of the world's tin mines in operation in 1989. Id.
301. See I.T.C. STATiSTIcS, supra note I, at 19 (presenting a chart of world tin
production between 1976-1986).
302. See Bolivia Debates Tin Mining Costs, METAL BULL, Mar. 30, 1989, at 11
(stating that a fifty percent rise in Bolivia's tin output is possible); Bolivia Expects
Sharp Rise in Tin Output, Fin. Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at 36 (discussing the costs
involved in restarting one of the world's largest tin mines).
303. Brazil and China have again refused to join the A.T.P.C. In August 1989,
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Also, their relationship to the new international tin study group needs
definition.
B. INDIRECT EFFECTS
1. Spill-Over into Other Markets
The tin market crash in 1985 certainly depressed the prices of other
metals on the L.M.E., but had little cumulative effect on the world's
metal markets; metal prices fell only marginally and briefly.304 Each
metal market ultimately responds to its own specific influences (in ad-
dition to general macroeconomic conditions) and the tin market af-
fected other metals only to the degree it injected uncertainty into the
L.M.E., one of many metal exchanges in the world.
2. Other Commodity Agreements
A frequent prediction during the crisis was that the Tin Agreement's
collapse would cause the demise of the buffer stock as a regulatory
instrument, and perhaps other international commodity agreements °.3 0
On the surface, the second part of this prophecy appears correct. The
Cocoa Agreement ran out of money in 1988, had to suspend its opera-
tions, and was not rescued by its members.3 0 6 The Coffee Agreement
collapsed in July 1989.307
Closer examination, however, proves that no direct linkages between
these three events exists. While the three Agreements had similar aims,
they had different products, membership, regulatory schemes, and
problems.30 8 The problem of the Cocoa Agreement came to a head in
the same month as that of tin, not afterwards.309 The continued
Malaysia accused Brazil and China of substantially overshooting the quotas they had
been given. See Tin Listless as $ Takes its Toll, METAL BULL., June 15, 1989, at 7;
Malaysia Backs Continuation of Tin Quotas, Fin. Times, Aug. 30, 1989, at 28.
304. Compare Commodity Price Index, The ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1985, at 93,
with Commodity Price Index, The ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1986, at 81 (indicating that the
index metal prices as of November 26, 1985 were down only one per cent (in both
pounds sterling and SDR terms) from a month earlier).
305. Gilbert, supra note 269, at 591; B.S. CHIMNI, supra note 158, at 197; War-
brick & Cheyne, The International Tin Council, 36 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 931, 935
(1987).
306. Commodity Price Index, The ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1989, at 115.
307. Blackwell, International Coffee Pact Collapses, Fin. Times, July 4, 1989, at
30.
308. See Gilbert, supra note 269, at 591; E. ERNST, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS: THE SYSTEM OF CONTROLLING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY MAR-
KET (The Hague 1982); F. GORDON-ASHWORTH, supra note 43, app., at 289.
309. See Wassermann, Tin and Other Commodities in Crisis, 20 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 232, 233 (1986) (revealing the crisis facing cocoa as a commodity).
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charmed existence of the Rubber Agreement310 demonstrates that
I.T.A.'s demise did not exert any independent destructive effect on the
structure of international commodity regulation. Indeed, the implemen-
tation in July 1989 of the "Common Fund for Commodities" under the
auspices of the United Nations (even if it is more modest than once
envisaged) should show conclusively that active regulation of the inter-
national commodity markets is not out of fashion.311 The most that can
be said is that the I.T.A.'s failure sapped the desire of some countries
both to rescue those other agreements which were in trouble and to
support new ones.
The buffer stock was certainly brought into disrepute by the Agree-
ment's collapse. One must, however, distinguish between the potential
effectiveness of a buffer stock and its actual management in a given
case. Other buffer stocks have operated for years without such spectac-
ular failure. One therefore should not be quick to assume that other
mechanisms of regulation are necessarily better. One suggestion, ex-
isting for some time, is that a mechanism of "compensatory finance" is
more efficient than a buffer stock because it directly reimburses pro-
ducing countries for cyclical diminution in the value of their export
earnings from commodities instead of interfering in the market.312 This
may prove true, but whether a compensatory scheme for tin might have
been more effective in averting a crisis in 1985 is difficult to determine.
The problems of maintaining the export earnings of commodity export-
ers are so massive that even well-funded compensatory finance schemes
can be strained. The collapse of the Coffee Agreement and the subse-
quent decline in price of coffee may cause enormous claims to be made
to Stabex, the compensatory finance fund which the European Commu-
nity administers in favor of developing countries. These claims may be
more than the fund can bear.313
The I.T.A.'s collapse should thus properly stand not as an indictment
of either the international commodity agreement or the buffer stock,
but as a reminder of the enormous power of world commodity markets
to sweep away all but the best designed, funded, and managed regula-
tory schemes. In particular, it has been suggested that any commodity
agreement launched or continued in the future must receive greater
attention to three things: securing real consensus of members (and the
310. Sulong, Rubber Agreement Bounces with Health, Fin. Times, Mar. 1. 1989,
at 38.
311. Will They Never Learn?, THE ECONOWiuST, July 29, 1989, at 75.
312. D. NEWBERY & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 28, at 16.
313. Bloom, Coffee Price Fall May Bankrupt EC Body, Fin. Times. July 18, 1989,
at 16.
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industries they represent) over the purpose of the agreement; specifying
within the agreement the precise means of attaining these objectives
and the financial responsibilities of its members; and insulating the
agreement from foreign exchange risk by denominating its affairs in a
basket currency such as the Special Drawing Right (SDR).1 To these
one can add three further considerations. Decision-making in the agree-
ment should be structured so that it will not be paralyzed by the whims
of one or two of its members. Any buffer stock (or similar active
agency) henceforth established or continued should operate under
clearer guidelines and stricter supervision; in particular, if borrowing
and futures trading are allowed, responsible parameters are needed. Fi-
nally, members should be entitled to full and timely information on its
operations.
3. International Organizations Distinct Entities
Notwithstanding the final conclusion of an out-of-court settlement, the
most important intangible legacy of the Council's collapse is the legal
precedent that, absent any government commitments or constitutional
language of the organizations to the contrary, international organiza-
tions that are set up as separate bodies are ultimately on their own,
even to the prejudice of third party creditors. As with domestic limited
liability corporations, this is a mixed blessing. This precedent should
forward the interests of international order by affirming that interna-
tional organizations have a distinct and independent legal personality.
It should also cause creditors of international organizations to reassess
more regularly and prudently their exposure, particularly to those mul-
tilateral agencies with substantial economic responsibilities.31
Many creditors of the Council claimed during the crisis that absolv-
314. See Gilbert, supra note 269, at 613-14 (noting flaws to avoid and guidelines to
follow for drafting a commodity agreement). At least one commodity agreement has
responded to the I.T.C.'s collapse by amending its text: the Rubber Agreement now has
a clause limiting its members' liabilities to the organization or to third parties to the
extent of their contributions. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dep't of Trade and Industry,
[1988] All E.R. 257, 306.
315. Tinco Realisations attempted to capitalize on this point to force a settlement.
In 1988, Tinco warned the public of the alleged dangers of dealing with the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency, a new international organization that insures
against risks of private investment in the developing world. Tinco claimed that the
agency is juridically similar to the I.T.C. and therefore susceptible to abandonment by
its members upon insolvency. An ITC Double, TIN INT'L, Apr. 1988, at 9. In this
context of caveat creditor, however, the obvious cannot be over-emphasized: potential
creditors of an international organization should examine carefully both the constitu-
tion and the management of the specific organization with which they deal to deter-
mine the extent of the credit risk which they will assume. Id.
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ing the governments from liability would have dire consequences for
sovereign lending; if the world's richest countries default on obligations
that are supposedly theirs, then the largest debtors among the develop-
ing countries would be encouraged to follow suit.316 This fear is un-
founded, for it ignores the fact that the situation of the I.T.C.'s debts is
different in a crucial aspect. The problem addressed in the I.T.C. cases
was whether the member states were liable for the Council's debts as if
the debts were their own; the Court held that they were not because
the Council was a separate entity interposed between the states and the
creditors. With sovereign creditors, the debts are clearly incurred in
their own names and cannot be denied. The I.T.C. precedent can thus
only be relevant to the resolution of loans made to separate state enter-
prises of these sovereign borrowers without benefit of an express gov-
ernmental guarantee. As domestic corporate or company law should
suffice to shield the governments in most cases, the precedent's implica-
tions for sovereign lending are most directly applicable to the situation
where pairs or small groups of states by treaty establish an economic
entity that is to act within their borders, but is not a creature of their
national company law regimes.3"'
4. International Law in National Courts
The relationship between international and national law always has
been a complex and uneasy one. Although national courts often must
resort to international law rules to dispose of the cases before them,
they usually have done so when the rules are clear and when those
rules are part of the domestic national fabric by either custom or incor-
poration of a treaty by the national parliament. 3 8 In the I.T.C. cases,
the English Court of Appeal not only interpreted the terms of a treaty
that had not been incorporated into English law, but also attempted to
decide the issues according to international law. A prominent national
court thus made the rare step of unhesitatingly assuming the role of an
316. Memorandum of Sir Adam Ridley, supra note 131, at 31.
317. An example of such an entity is Itaipu, which Brazil and Paraguay established
by treaty in 1973 to construct and manage a mammoth hydroelectric project on the
Parand River. Treaty concerning the hydro-electric utilization or the water resources of
the Paran. River, Apr. 26, 1973, Brazil-Paraguay, 923 U.N.T.S. 91. The Parties cre-
ated Itaipu as a "binational entity," with its capital to come from the electricity com-
panies of the two countries. Id. The governments gave Itaipu independent juridical and
financial capacity to undertake the project, including the power to borrow. Id. The
stand-alone character of the "binational entity" is emphasized by the treaty provisions
which enabled Itaipu to request the two governments to guarantee its indebtedness. Id.
318. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-53 (3d Ox-
ford 1982).
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international tribunal.
CONCLUSION
The insolvency of the I.T.C. was not the largest in history, but will
be recorded as one of the most significant. It was the first time that the
actions of commercial creditors have terminated the activities of an in-
ternational organization. It was also the first time an international or-
ganization has been so swiftly and utterly abandoned by its members to
the great detriment of others. The effects of the collapse were many
and of varying strength and longevity. The impact on the creditors and
producers has been severe, but (with a few exceptions) will ease over
time. The same cannot be said for the diplomatic and legal precedents
established by the collapse, which will be much more durable.
As shown herein, defects in the drafting of the Agreement, adverse
macroeconomic conditions, and fortuitous movements in exchange rates
caused the collapse. Such attribution to impersonal or external phe-
nomena, however, should not mask the locus of primary responsibility:
the governments of the member states. The governments established
the Agreement with ambitious but inconsistent goals. The governments
drafted the Agreement's defective text; the structure they created first
blinded them to the Council's suicidal course and then rendered them
incapable of altering it. The governments-save a noble few such as
those of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, as well as the Com-
mission of the E.C.--did little to secure a prompt and reasonable solu-
tion to the crisis which they had let happen. Notwithstanding the pro-
priety of the decisions exculpating the states from legal liability, one
can only echo the words of the English Court of Appeal that the con-
duct of the governments was at the very least unbecoming; it caused
what must be the sorriest episode in the history of international eco-
nomic organizations.
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